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Executive Summary 
The input and output distribution systems of the agricultural sector in Rwanda were 
examined in this study. The large intervention by the EEC and the government in the fertilizer 
distribution system has generated pre-market conditions in this subsector. The pre-market stage 
describes the prevailing market structure where the existing institutions for the most part operate 
on a supply-leading approach, rather than demand driven, and provide in-kind subsidies to 
promote the development of agriculture. It is only recently with new economic opportunities, 
realized through potato production and regional exports, that an effective demand for fertilizer 
has finally emerged. This has induced several private entrepreneurs to take the initiative to 
market fertilizer. With access to finance and information, and minimum investment or 
specialization, entrepreneurs are able to engage in spot market activities to market fertilizer in 
wholesale and retail markets. The import level, however, is still largely distorted by the price 
subsidy which precludes the emergence of any private sector initiative at this level of operation. 
Pesticides, in contrast to fertilizer, are imported into Rwanda by a few private entrepre-
neurs. At the same time, the parastatal institutions, APNI and OCIR-CAFE, import pesticides 
at close to world market prices. Therefore, the marketing of pesticides is more demand driven 
than fertilizer, where only the fertilizer demand in the potato and tea subsectors are market 
driven. Pesticides are marketed by private entrepreneurs in wholesale and retail markets largely 
through spot market transactions. 
Financial contracts that facilitate the flow of commodities in the input channels are rather 
thin. At the import level, parastatal institutions make payments directly from their respective 
accounts at the BNR to a development fund sponsored by the EEC. Private entrepreneurs, 
however, who engage in the importation of pesticides use the typical letter of credit which is 
obtained at a domestic commercial bank. At the wholesale level, all parastatal institutions sell 
in cash to all types of clients except for OCIR-THE which sells fertilizer on credit to its 
outgrowers. 
Private entrepreneurs handling modem inputs, except for NGOs, also sell in cash to most 
of their clients, both in wholesale and retail markets. Wholesalers sell modem inputs to NGOs 
on credit since they are considered reliable customers with an international donor guarantee. 
Finally at the retail level, most sales are in cash. The NGOs, however, utilize several 
approaches to assist their clients to obtain inputs resulting in a confusing array of mechanisms. 
Some NGOs sell inputs at different prices in cash, while others offer credit, and yet others take 
advance payments, and, not surprisingly, others provide grants to their cooperative or farmer 
clienteles. 
A number of constraints exist for private sector participation in the distribution of modem 
inputs. First, farmers' demand for pesticides and fertilizer is largely a function of the 
profitability of their principal crop. Unless farmers are engaged in potato or tea production, 
they are not very willing or able to purchase these inputs. Second, although entrepreneurs might 
enjoy some scope economies, scale economies are limited in the agricultural input subsectors, 
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especially in small markets. Third, the poverty and small land-holding structure in Rwanda 
restricts large scale production processes that employ yield enhancing inputs and technologies. 
Access to financial markets does not appear to be a problem for the few entrepreneurs currently 
involved in the wholesale trade of fertilizer and pesticides. With increased competition, 
however, trade credit might be a necessary marketing tool, as in the case of other subsectors. 
The terms of trade credit for fertilizer and pesticides are dependent on the production cycle of 
the crop on which these inputs are used. Clearly, a higher risk is associated with longer produc-
tion periods because of increased asymmetric information problems for any input dealer 
extending credit to farmers. 
To promote private sector initiative in the input marketing systems in Rwanda, certain 
conditions have to be ensured. In the case of pesticides, this implies reducing the quantities 
imported by parastatal institutions to allow private importers the opportunity to completely take 
over the import market. This in turn will further induce more private wholesale and retail 
marketing of pesticides to the extent there is an effective demand for the products. In the case 
of fertilizer, the primary condition to induce efficient private sector marketing is to completely 
abolish import subsidies. This would imply that if economic opportunities exist--such as potato 
production which generates an effective demand for fertilizer--entrepreneurs would have an 
incentive to enter this subsector. 
It is important to continue research efforts that will improve yields through the utilization 
of improved seed varieties, use of modern agricultural inputs and new technologies. This will 
help identify and expand the production frontier of many African countries such as Rwanda as 
they search for their comparative advantage in growing new crops that have an export potential 
in both regional or international markets. Extension efforts should continue to educate fanners 
on the advantages of using improved seed varieties, modern inputs and technologies. Effective 
demand for these inputs and technologies would grow naturally from the farmers' realization of 
improved yields and higher returns with increased use of these inputs. 
The production of horticultural crops in Rwanda is limited. This study examined three 
relatively important output subsectors: potatoes, the most commercialized crop in Rwanda; dry 
beans, although a basic staple, the country is least self-sufficient in the production of this crop; 
and fresh fruits and vegetables--tomatoes, french green beans and bananas--which are important 
because of their export potential. The wholesale and retail trade in dry beans and potatoes is 
largely characterized by spot market transactions. Wholesalers, although generally specialized 
in dry beans marketing, have a low investment in specific assets. Many potato traders are new 
entrants in the market indicating the low level of asset specificity needed to carry out trading and 
minimal sunk costs facilitating entry in this market. There are increasingly more dry beans 
wholesalers becoming involved in potato marketing. Potato production faces few uncertainties 
with the use of modern inputs. More importantly, with improved yields and higher returns, 
market uncertainties are very low and regional export opportunities are quite high. 
Interestingly, and common to spot market transactions, most wholesale and retail sales 
of dry beans and potatoes are paid for in cash. Little trade credit flows through the vertical 
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marketing channel. Wholesale and retail operators, in addition to formal credit, draw upon 
informal loans from their fellow wholesalers and participate in tontines at the retail level. This 
horizontal channel of finance at both levels of the marketing chain stands out in sharp contrast 
to the classic wholesale-retail flows of trade credit common to many developing and developed 
countries. This likely reflects the lack of well established and secure trading relationships 
between wholesalers and retailers in these markets in Rwanda that discourage the acceptance of 
the risk of lending and borrowing. In contrast, the established association among those trading 
side by side creates sufficient confidence for reciprocal lending practices among these agents. 
Perishable fruits and vegetables, tomatoes, green beans and bananas, were examined at 
the retail and wholesale/export levels. Tomatoes and green beans were typically sold at the 
retail level in spot market transactions. The production of these vegetables, although associated 
with relatively low asset specificity, involves relatively large production and market 
uncertainties. Production uncertainty grows out of the difficulties to control quality unless 
cultivation is closely monitored, while market uncertainty is strongly associated with the high 
degree of perishability of these crops. Access to finance in the case of retailers was limited to 
informal finance, largely tontines, and access to information was limited to the specific local 
retail markets in which they sell their produce. 
The export of non-traditional crops from Rwanda is limited; however, there have been 
successful attempts to draw up contractual arrangements with green beans and banana 
outgrowers. These arrangements include resource provisions, production management, and 
marketing outlets. The current export activities, however, are confmed to small scale initiatives. 
Policy efforts should focus on reducing some of the constraints to promote private sector 
participation in non-traditional export activities. 
The first and most binding constraint to the promotion of non-traditional exports is the 
small land-holding structure in Rwanda. Relaxing this constraint could be possibly achieved 
through more efficient cooperative farming systems or larger units of production. This 
constraint increases transaction costs and reduces scale economies of production. Moreover, it 
hampers the production of consistent quality produce that has export potential. Technical 
assistance should attempt to train farmers to grow quality produce. A second constraint hindering 
the development of non-traditional agricultural exports is access to information and fmance. 
These resources are costly for newly emerging private exporters to secure in Rwanda. Third, 
air transportation costs are expensive and the availability of regular and reliable air freight 
services is limited. Attracting airline companies to Rwanda would induce more competition in 
air cargo which would bring transportation costs more in line with market prices. Fourth, and 
last, the lack of refrigeration facilities at the airport in Kigali makes the time between harvest 
and transportation of perishable fruits and vegetables critical. Such facilities would involve large 
investments and would imply large costs for any single enterprise. However, investment in 
refrigeration facilities would reduce the constraints on exports. 
The prevailing conditions in Rwanda present binding constraints on the development of 
non-traditional agricultural exports. Public sector and donor intervention, however, could ease 
vi 
some these constraints. These efforts could largely focus on providing the appropriate 
information, infrastructure and technical support to encourage exports. A potential role for the 
goverrunent, in addition to improving the quality of physical infrastructure in the country, could 
focus on stimulating domestic linkages with export markets. Facilitating information flows about 
foreign markets could be achieved by sending local representatives abroad and providing 
information about domestic production to donors and foreign firms. Donors could play an 
important role in supporting local production of quality produce that has export potential. One 
way to encourage the formation of export firms is to stimulate the creation of venture capital 
firms. Supporting supply-leading credit programs, however, should be avoided. Donors should 
carefully evaluate the efficiency and role of support institutions, such as NGOs and cooperatives, 
that advice farmers on how to grow quality produce. The provision of technical assistance and 
the dissemination of new technologies to small producers in order to ensure the cultivation of 
high quality produce is the major challenge in the small land holding setting characteristic of 
Rwandan farmers. 
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INPUT AND OUTPUT DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS 
IN THE AGRI-BUSINESS SECTOR IN RW A.~A: MARKETS OR PRE-MARKETS? 
by 
Mayada M. Baydas, Douglas H. Graham and Jerome Bicamumpaka 
I. Introduction 
The impact of structural adjustment policy reforms (SAP) initiated in the late 1980s has 
not been fully realized in many developing economies. An important component of these 
policies is liberalization of the financial sector and agricultural input and output markets (World 
Bank, 1989). Financial sector reforms, though successful in removing serious financial market 
distortions, have yet to bring about the development of financial and institutional innovations to 
service the small but growing number of private enterprises. Private investments in the agricul-
tural sector are emerging slowly. Pursuing sound macroeconomic policies are a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for private sector development. Examination of the microeconomic 
impact of these policies within specific sectors of the economy is important for the study of the 
growth of these markets. 
The agricultural sector continues to be an important economic sector for most African 
countries. The nature of the economic agents operating in the agricultural input and output 
markets largely affects the efficiency of these markets. Financial contracts servicing the flow 
of commodities in the marketing channels also have a direct impact on the evolution of these 
markets. Thus, documentation of commodity marketing systems, their stage of development, 
the nature of the agents involved in the marketing of these commodities, and the terms and condi-
tions of the financial contracts used in their operations is necessary to understand the 
development of the private sector in the agribusiness sector. 
This study focuses on financial contracts in the agribusiness sector in Rwanda. Being a 
small landlocked country in Central Africa, with the highest population density in the continent 
(250 inhabitants per sq. km) and poor natural resources, Rwanda faces major challenges in its 
development. Given rapid population growth and a fragile economy, the development of the agribusi-
ness sector and the promotion of the agricultural marketing systems in Rwanda continue to be 
critical issues. The promotion of non-traditional exports to diversify foreign exchange earnings 
and the need to feed the growing population are two important reasons to develop agribusiness 
markets in Rwanda. 
The following section presents an initial overview of the Rwandan economy which 
highlights the importance of this study. Section three discusses the methodology adopted in the 
study of the agribusiness sector in Rwanda. The agricultural input networks, the agricultural 
output networks and the non-traditional agricultural exports are decribed in sections four, five 
and six, respectively. This is followed by a discussion of the constraints on the development 
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of the agnbusiness sector in section seven. Finally, section eight draws together the conclusions 
and recommendations of the study. 
II. Background on Rwanda 
Rwanda is one of the smallest African countries with an area of 26,338 square kilometers 
in the highlands of East-Central Africa. Combined with a population of 7.1 million, a per capita 
income of about US$270, and life expectancy at birth of 46 years, the country does not have 
many physical or human resources to assist its development efforts. 1 Although the share of 
agnculture in the gross domestic product has declined from roughly 75 percent to about 40 
percent over the past two and a half decades (Table 1), the sector still provides employment to 
90 percent of the population who live in rural areas. 2 Over the past decade, Rwanda has shifted 
from surpassing its modest population growth with high agricultural production to a reverse 
scenario (World Bank, 1991). These pressures have pushed Rwanda from self-sufficiency to 
increased total food imports over the 1980s. With population projections of 9 million for the 
year 2000 and 17 million for the year 2025, Rwanda will continue to face population pressures 
in the future. 
Table 1. Shares of Gross Domestic Product for Major Sectors in Rwanda, Selected 
years: 1965-1991. 
Year Agriculture Industry Services 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1965 74.8 6.9 18.4 
1973 61.0 8.7 30.2 
1980 45.8 21.5 32.6 
1986 37.0 23.9 39.0 
1987 37.0 23.0 40.0 
1988 38.0 22.0 40.0 
1989 37.0 23.0 41.0 
1990 38.0 22.0 40.0 
1991 38.0 22.0 40.0 
Sources: World Development Report, 1993; Trends in Developing Economies, 1989. 
Like many other African countries, Rwanda adopted a Structural Adjustment Program 
in the early 1990s to address its increasing economic pressures. Compared to neighboring 
countries, public sector expenditures in Rwanda have been relatively conservative over the two 
decades following independence. However, the decline in international coffee prices coupled 
1 World Development Report, 1993. 
2 World Development Report, 1993; World Bank, 1991. 
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with rapid population growth over the past five years have led to a current account deficit largely 
as a result of an imbalance in the merchandise account (Stryker and Shaw). Policy reforms have 
included devaluation, relaxation of trade controls, reduction of the budget deficit, and the 
promotion of exports. These policies, however, have not included comprehensive and complete 
liberalization of input and output markets. A brief review of the financial and agricultural 
sectors in the Rwandan economy will further clarify the conditions influencing the development 
of the agribusiness sector. 
1. Financial Sector in Rwanda 
This overview of the financial sector in Rwanda has two objectives. The first is to 
present a brief review of selected macro financial indicators that reveal the degree of financial 
deepening that has occurred in the economy. The second objective is to provide brief 
background information on the formal financial institutions of the country. 
A. Macro Financial Indicators 
The development of the financial sector in Rwanda, like most developing economies, is 
instrumental to the success of the SAP. Financial markets in Rwanda, however, are still 
shallow. Conventional monetary indicators, including the growth of money aggregates, the ratio 
of money to GDP and the relationship between currency and deposits, are used to shed some 
light on the degree of financial deepening of the economy. The data in Table 2 indicate that the 
growth rates of M1 (the sum of currency outside banks and demand deposits), quasi-money (time 
and savings deposits) and M2 (Ml plus interest bearing deposits) have experienced marked fluctua-
tions over the past two decades. First, currency and demand deposits recorded double digit 
growth over the 1970s. This trend, however, is in contrast to much slower and stable growth 
over the 1980s. Second, interest bearing deposits have recorded double digit growth rates for 
most of the 1970s and 80s. The past few years, which were marked by civil unrest, indicate 
much slower growth of quasi-money. Third, the growth rate of M2 exhibits a similar trend to 
that of quasi-money. The popular indicator of financial deepening, M2 tQ GDP, has generally 
increased from about 13 percent to 17 percent over the past decade (Table 3). This trend has 
been accompanied by a general decline in the ratio of Ml to GDP coupled with a steady increase 
in the ratio of quasi-money to GDP. These two ratios are still rather small underscoring the 
continuing significance of informal finance and barter transactions in the Rwandan economy. 
Minor disturbances in these trends over the past few years can be explained by the civil unrest 
that has affected Northern Rwanda from 1989 to 1993. 
Another important indicator of the degree of financial intermediation in an economy is 
the ratio of currency to demand deposits (Table 4, column 3). Although this ratio declined in 
the 1970s, the trend depicted over the 1980s indicates that the continued willingness to hold 
currency is at least as strong as that of holding monetary substitutes, such as current accounts. 
These figures imply that cash transactions are popular in Rwanda and that informal financial 
transactions likely play a significant role in commercial activity. It is not surprising to have the 
currency to demand deposit ratio close to one considering that 90 percent of the population live 
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in rural areas where checking accounts are less developed than interest bearing accounts. The 
ratio of currency to interest bearing deposits, however, which also decreased over the 1970s and 
early 1980s has been maintained between 0.5 and 0.6 for the past five years. This further 
indicates an increased demand for time and saving deposits which might be explained by the 
growth of financial intermediaries and their branches in the country. 
Table 2. Aggregate Monetary Measures in Nominal Terms and Rates of Change in 
Rwanda: 1972-1992. (millions of FRW)a 
Year Ml Ml (M2-Ml) M2-M1 M2 M2 
(%Change) (%Change) (% Change) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1972 2520 453 2973 
73 3565 41.5 464 2.4 4029 35.5 
74 4288 20.3 1063 129.1 5351 32.8 
75 4850 13.1 1147 7.9 5997 12.1 
76 6516 34.4 1530 33.4 8046 34.1 
77 8035 23.3 2104 37.5 10139 26.0 
78 8961 11.5 2220 5.5 11181 10.3 
79 11255 25.6 2831 27.5 14086 26.0 
80 12026 6.9 3200 13.0 15226 8.1 
81 11774 -2.1 4209 31.5 15983 5.0 
82 11460 -2.7 4712 12.0 16172 1.2 
83 12317 7.5 5759 22.2 18076 11.8 
84 13343 8.3 6549 13.7 19892 10.1 
85 14699 10.2 8731 33.3 23430 17.8 
86 17334 17.9 9274 6.2 26608 13.6 
87 17791 2.6 11549 24.5 29340 10.3 
88 18332 3.1 13159 13.9 31491 7.3 
89 16053 -12.4 14132 7.4 30185 -4.2 
90 16846 4.9 15020 6.3 31866 5.6 
91 18145 7.7 15480 3.1 33625 5.5 
92 22631 24.7 15162 -2.1 37793 12.4 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1993. 
a: M1 consists of currency and demand deposits. 
M2 consists of interest bearing deposits and M 1. 
Quasi Money or (M2-M1) consists of interest bearing deposits. 
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Table 3. Measures of Financial Deepening in Rwanda: 1972-1992. a 
Year Ml!GDP (M2-Ml)/GDP M2/GDP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1972 6.47 1.16 7.64 
73 8.54 1.10 9.66 
74 8.71 2.16 10.87 
75 9.18 2.17 11.35 
76 10.52 2.47 12.99 
77 11.22 2.94 14.16 
78 11.05 2.74 13.78 
79 11.55 2.90 14.46 
80 11.13 2.96 14.09 
81 9.60 3.43 13.03 
82 8.75 3.59 12.35 
83 8.67 4.05 12.72 
84 8.39 4.12 12.50 
85 8.46 5.02 13.49 
86 10.18 5.44 15.62 
87 10.36 6.73 17.09 
88 10.39 7.45 17.84 
89 8.44 7.43 15.86 
90 8.73 7.79 16.52 
91 8.52 7.27 15.79 
92 10.18 6.82 17.00 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1993. 
a: Ml consists of currency and demand deposits. 
M2 consists of interest bearing deposits and M 1. 
Quasi Money or (M2-Ml) consists of interest bearing deposits. 
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Table 4. Selected Measures of Currency, Demand Deposits and Quasi-Money 
Indicators in Rwanda: 1972-1992 (millions of FRW). 
Year Currency (C) Demand CIDD (M2-Ml) C/(M2-M1) 
Deposits (DD) 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1972 1446 1074 1.35 453 3.19 
73 2003 1562 1.28 464 4.32 
74 2553 1735 1.47 1063 2.40 
75 2722 2128 1.28 1147 2.37 
76 ~3070 3446 0.89 1530 2.01 
77 3948 4087 0.96 2104 1.88 
78 4443 4518 0.98 2220 2.00 
79 5242 6013 0.87 2831 1.85 
80 5689 6337 0.89 3200 1.78 
81 6086 5688 1.07 4209 1.45 
82 6260 5200 1.20 4712 1.33 
83 6662 5655 1.18 5759 1.16 
84 7030 6313 1.11 6549 1.07 
85 7161 7538 0.95 8731 0.82 
86 7686 9648 0.79 9274 0.83 
87 8203 9588 0.85 11549 0.71 
88 8439 9893 0.85 13159 0.64 
89 7744 8309 0.93 14132 0.55 
90 8593 8253 1.04 15020 0.57 
91 8822 9323 0.95 15480 0.57 
92 10321 12310 0.84 15162 0.68 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1993. 
B. The Banking Industry 
Presently, there are seven banks in Rwanda, five of which are under the supervision of 
central bank authorities, the Banque National de Rwanda (BNR). These are: the Banque 
Commerciale du Rwanda (BCR), the oldest and largest commercial bank; Banque de Kigali 
(BK), the second largest commercial bank; Banque Continentale Africaine (Rwanda) (BACAR), 
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the third commercial bank; Caisse d'Epargne du Rwanda (CER), a national savings and loan 
institution; and, the Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda (UBP), a cooperative bank with 
the largest number of rural branches. The Banque Rwandaise de Development (BRD)--a 
development bank dependent upon grants--and the Caisse Hypothecaire du Rwanda (CHR)--a 
mortgage bank--are not supervised by the BNR. Table 5 presents a breakdown of all the banks 
in the country and their branches. All bank headquarters are in the capital of Kigali and almost 
all branches of the commercial banks are located in secondary cities in the rural areas. The 
Union des Banques Populaires is the only bank which has branches in every prefecture and most 
communes in the country. 3 The total number of branches of all the banks in the country, 
including headquarter units, was 172 as of end of 1991. This makes the average population to 
bank branch density ratio equal to 41,279. The population to bank density ratio in Rwanda is 
comparable to other African countries such as The Gambia where this ratio was 52,941 in 1992. 
Table 5. Distribution of Bank Branches in Rwanda: 1990-1991. 
Banks a As of 12/3111990 As of 12/31/1991 
Headquarters Branches Offices Headquarters Branches Offices 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
BCR 1 14 3 1 14 3 
BK 1 6 3 1 6 3 
CER 1 18 4 1 18 3 
UBP 1 119 0 1 124 0 
BRD 1 3 Posts 0 1 3 Posts 0 
BACAR 1 0 0 1 0 0 
CHR 1 0 0 1 0 0 
TOTAL 7 160 10 7 165 9 
Source: GOR, Ra1mort sur !'Evolution Economigue et Montaire du Rwanda, 1991. 
a: BCR: 
BK: 
CER: 
UBP: 
BRD: 
BACAR: 
CHR: 
Banque Commerciale du Rwanda; 
Banque de Kigali; 
Caisse d'Epargne du Rwanda; 
Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda; 
Banque Rwandaise de Development; 
Banque Continentale Africaine (Rwanda); 
Caisse Hypothecaire du Rwanda. 
3 Prefectures are analogous to counties and communes are analogous to districts. 
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Nominal interest rates, both deposit and lending, were almost constant over the 1980s 
in Rwanda (Table 6). Deposit rates, however, were barely positive in real terms. Over the past 
two years, as inflation jumped to double digit levels in 1991 and 1992, real deposit rates became 
negative. Lending rates, on the other hand, were substantially positive in real terms until 
recently when they also feH to a negative value in 1991 with increased inflation. The low 
deposit rates provide another explanation for the slow and negative growth of interest bearing 
deposits over the past few years. The lending rate, however, has a direct bearing on the demand 
and distribution for credit which has fluctuated as well over the years. 
Table 6. 
Period 
(1) 
1980-87 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Source: 
Inflation, Nominal and Real Deposit and Lending Rates (average annual 
rates). 
Inflation Nominal Interest Real Interest Rates4 
Rates 
CPI GDP Deflator Deposit Lending Deposit Lending 
Rate Rate Rate Rate 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
5.00 4.50 6.25 13.55 1.19 8.14 
2.91 2.98 6.25 12.00 3.25 8.84 
1.03 6.82 6.31 12.00 5.15 10.78 
4.20 0.48 6.88 13.17 2.57 8.61 
19.62 12.80 8.75 19.00 -9.07 -0.51 
9.51 1.71 7.73 16.67 -1.62 6.54 
World Bank, World Development Report, 1989; International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook, 1993. 
The share of private versus public sector credit in total domestic credit has changed over 
the past decade. The values in Table 7 indicate that the share of public sector credit in total 
GDP has increased steadily from the late 1980s onwards to reach almost 12 percent in 1992. 
This trend is in contrast to that of the private sector credit to GDP ratio which reached a high 
of about 12 percent in 1988, only to decline over the past four years to 7 to 8 percent. On the 
one hand, the decline in the claims on the private sector may be attributed to more conservative 
lending practices by commercial banks given the negative real rates of interest and the civil 
unrest in the country in recent years. On the other hand, the increase in claims on the public 
sector indicates an increase in expenditures financed through borrowing to cover increases in the 
budget deficit. 
4 Real interest rates (r) were derived using the formula r=[(l +i)/(1 +p)]-1; where i is the 
nominal interest rate and pis the inflation rate (the Consumer Price Index was used here). 
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Table 7. Outstanding Balances of Private and Public Sector Credit and Ratios of 
Credit to Total GDP in Rwanda: 1982-92 (millions of FRW). 
Year Total Public Total Private Public Sector Cred- Private Sector Cred-
Sector Credif Sector Credit it/GDP it/GDP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1982 24 9463 0.02 7.23 
83 3199 10211 2.25 7.19 
84 2866 12357 1.80 7.77 
85 2699 15665 1.55 9.02 
86 3631 15894 2.13 9.33 
87 7703 16541 4.49 9.63 
88 9528 20677 5.39 11.71 
89 13089 6150 6.88 3.23 
90 21156 19135 10.97 9.92 
91 18410 15412 8.65 7.24 
92 25842 18461 11.63 8.31 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1993. 
The distribution of domestic credit among the principal sectors of the economy over the 
period 1987-1992 is presented in Table 8. On the one hand, these percentages indicate a 
decreasing share of domestic credit to agriculture and livestock after 1989. The share of credit 
disbursed to coffee and tea has been decreasing as a percent of the total share of agricultural 
credit as well. This may be explained by the decreased returns from coffee after the drop in 
international coffee prices. On the other hand, the values in Table 8 indicate an increasing trend 
in the shares of manufacturing, construction and public works, commerce and services. The 
share of domestic credit allocated to fertilizer and pesticides within manufacturing is negligible. 
Similarly, the share of credit allocated to the marketing of food products represents only a 
negligible share within the broad category of commerce. Interestingly, this indicates that the 
amount of formal credit associated with agricultural inputs and outputs, other than coffee and 
tea, is less than one percent. This underscores the continuing predominant role of informal 
finance in servicing domestic agriculture. 
5 Includes net claims on government plus credit to public entities. 
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Table 8. Distribution of Domestic Credit by Economic Subsector in Rwanda: As 
of 12/31/1987-1992 (in percent). 
Share of Sector of Activity 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Agriculture & Livestock: 35.67 33.80 35.08 9.95 7.58 8.69 
Coffee & Tea 28.03 25.01 25.9 4.53 1.09 1.05 
Others 7.63 8.78 9.11 5.42 6.49 7.64 
Manufacturing & Mining: 10.57 15.69 15.03 17.86 23.45 22.09 
Fertilizer & Pesticides n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.13 0.00 0.18 
Electricity and Gas 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.55 
Buildings and Public Works 2.9 2.19 2.06 17.20 21.44 17.96 
Commerce: 25.2 22.61 19.78 41.37 32.89 35.60 
Food Products n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.77 0.33 0.69 
Services 4.6 3.13 4.49 10.57 11.25 11.16 
Individuals and Others 21.02 22.56 22.49 2.82 3.30 3.94 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: BNR, Bulletin No. 19, 1993; GOR, Ray12ort sur !'Evolution Economigue et 
Montaire du Rwanda, 1991. 
a Includes production and agro-industry. 
b Mostly imports. 
2. Agricultural Sector in Rwanda 
Agriculture production in Rwanda is characterized by smallholder farming in which over 
half of the million rural households cultivate less than one hectare of land (World Bank, 1991). 
Interestingly, Rwanda differs from many other African countries, and developing countries for 
that matter, in that there is no well established village structure in the rural areas. Rwandans 
live in dispersed hillside settlements. Land use is characterized by a large number of small 
holdings. By law, all land in Rwanda belongs to the government. The densely settled and 
intensively farmed hillsides and valleys (marais) are made up of predominantly small producers 
operating with established usufruct rights for their holdings. Cropland comprises roughly 50 
percent of the total area and only seven percent of the total cultivated area is used for growing 
export and industrial crops. 6 Farming technology is traditional and production is largely 
subsistence oriented (Von Braun et al.). About 63 percent of the value of agricultural production 
6 Export crops are coffee, tea and pyrethrum and industrial crops are rice, sugar and wheat 
(World Bank, 1991). 
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in consumed on the farm. The traditional staples are dry beans, sweet potatoes, cassava, 
sorghum and bananas. The major cash crops, sorghum and bananas, have been used in beer 
processing. Soil fertility is maintained by fallow and the use of organic fertilizer, such as mulch 
and manure. Wealth holdings in the form of livestock assets, however, have been decreasing 
under growing population pressure, diminishing pasture and farm sizes. 
The use of modem agricultural inputs was introduced only in the past decade in Rwanda. 
These modem inputs are used mainly for tea and only more recently for coffee and potatoes. 
Pesticides and fungicides were only introduced in recent years to increase the yields of coffee 
and more importantly potatoes. Fertilizer consumption in Rwanda grew from 300 grams of plant 
nutrient per hectare of arable land in 1979/80 to 2,600 grams in 1990/91 (World Bank, 1993). 
This may be contrasted with other African countries where there were no increases over the past 
decade such as in Madagascar (2,500 grams per hectare in 1979/80 vs. 2,600 grams in 1990/91) 
and others where there was a decrease over the past decade such as in Ghana (6,500 grams per 
hectare in 1979/80 vs. 4,800 grams in 1990/91). Rwanda, however, is still among the low 
fertilizer using countries in the world (World Bank, 1991). 
Table 9. Structure of Rwandan Agricultural Exports (Quantity in Tons and Value 
in 1000 FRW): 1991-92. 
1991 1992 
Crop Quantity % Value % Quantity % Value % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Coffee 37642.0 72.0 7203890 69.3 33797.0 70.2 4671754 60.1 
Tea 13297.0 25.4 2796629 26.9 13405.0 27.9 2761491 35.5 
Pyrethrum 31.6 0.1 279303 2.7 26.8 0.1 243504 3.1 
Quinquina 209.0 0.4 24123 0.2 318.0 0.7 36172 0.5 
Vegetables 117.0 0.2 24014 0.2 139.0 0.3 29910 0.4 
Flowers 2.7 0.0 247 0.0 1.5 0.0 136 0.0 
Plants 997.0 1.9 66994 0.6 424.7 0.9 28556 0.4 
Potatoes 0 0.0 0 0.0 2.4 0.0 38 0.0 
Bananas 0 0.0 0 0.0 17.2 0.0 2628 0.0 
Maracuja 0 0.0 0 0.0 3.2 0.0 783 0.0 
Other fruits 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.7 0.0 194 0.0 
Total 52296. 100 10395200 100 48134.8 100 7774972 100 
Source: BNR, 1993. 
The major export crops are coffee and tea. These constitute about 95 percent of all 
agricultural export crops both in quantity and value of foreign earnings (Table 9). Non-tradi-
tional exports include pyrethrum, bananas, potatoes, fresh vegetables (especially green beans), 
ornamental plants and flowers. The export of these non-traditional crops began only in the past 
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few years and they are all largely in their infant stages. The principal destinations of vegetable 
and banana exports are the EEC countries, Belgium and France in particular, and some regional 
countries including Burundi and Zaire for potatoes. 
Apart from traditional staples, horticultural production in Rwanda is still minimal. 
Bananas are the most important fruit grown. Its relative share among the categories of agricul-
tural products has been about 52-55 percent from 1989-92 (Table 10). Root crops are the 
second most important category of crops in terms of quantity (35 percent). Grain crops, 
although representing the principal food staple, make up only about six percent of total 
production. Finally, pulses represent only four percent of the total quantity of agricultural 
production. The total share of fresh fruits and vegetables--excluding bananas and root crops--in 
total agricultural production is just two percent' (Table 11). The mean value of net sales of 
fruits and vegetables--excluding bananas and root crops--per household in Rwanda represents less 
than one percent of total household net sales (Loveridge). Thus, it is not surprising that there 
is almost no documentation about either the production or marketing of fruits and vegetables 
other than bananas and potatoes. 
Table 10. Agricultural Production and Shares of Principal Product Groups (in 1000 
Tons): 1989-92. 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
Categorya Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Bananas 2,297 51.8 2,551 55.2 2,502 50.7 2,745 54.9 
Pulses 268 6.1 224 4.8 241 4.9 203 4.1 
Grains 295 6.7 305 6.6 328 6.7 291 5.8 
Root Crops 1,571 35.5 1,545 33.4 1,864 37.8 1,758 35.2 
Total 4,433 100 4,625 100 4,935 100 4,997 100 
Source: BNR, 1993; MINAGRI, 1989. 
a Pulses include dry beans, peas, peanuts and soybeans. 
Grains include rice, maize, sorghum, wheat and others. 
Root crops include irish potato, sweet potato, cassava and other tubers. 
7 The distribution of agricultural production by crop was last reported for 1989. 
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Table 11. Agricultural Production by Crop in Rwanda: 1989. 
Crop Quantity (Tons) Percent 
(1) (2) (3) 
Banana 2,328,901 50.85 
Dry Beans 227,964 4.98 
Peas 17,667 0.38 
Peanuts 15,158 0.33 
Soybean 9,030 0.19 
Sorghum 179,550 3.92 
Maize 96,283 2.10 
Eleusine 254 0.01 
Wheat 7,920 0.17 
Rice 11,660 0.25 
Sweet Potato 857,075 18.71 
Irish Potato 276,061 6.03 
Cassava 411,384 8.98 
Taro 40,853 0.89 
Yams 4,340 0.09 
Vegetables 37,269 0.81 
Fruits 58,759 1.28 
Total 4,580,128 100 
Source: MINAGRI, 1989. 
Ill. Methodology 
This study of the agribusiness sector in Rwanda will examine both the input and output 
marketing networks. Over the past decade, with deteriorating soil conditions and a decline in 
agricultural productivity, modern agricultural inputs--such as fertilizer and pesticides--were 
introduced in Rwanda to enhance productivity. Agricultural production, as noted earlier, largely 
stays on the farm for subsistence purposes. Aside from coffee and tea exports, non-traditional 
agricultural exports only emerged in the early 1990s. Given these conditions, it is not surprising 
that both the agricultural input and output networks in Rwanda are still in their early developing 
stages. Agricultural commodities are marketed through various channels by formal and informal 
agents, depending on the product. The rest of this study will document and analyze these 
marketing networks and the financial contracts facilitating these transactions. 
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1. Conceptual Framework 
This systematic approach to the study of the financial networks servicing the agribusiness 
sector in Rwanda utilizes a modified subsector analysis. The subsector methodology entails the 
study of vertical linkages in the distribution of commodities among the different economic agents 
(Boomgard et al.). This includes an analysis of the role of the economic agents involved, the 
terms and conditions of their contracts and the linkages in their transactions. The analysis is 
further enhanced by examining the financial contracts that characterize the linkages in the distribu-
tion of commodities along the vertical channels. The incorporation of finance into this modified 
subsector framework allows for identifying the marketing and financial constraints that shape the 
development of efficient markets (Nagarajan and Meyer). Marketing mechanisms vary from spot 
markets, to contractual arrangements, to vertical integration. In addition to asset specificity and 
uncertainty of production, Nagarajan and Meyer propose incorporating financial and informa-
tional flows as endogenous determinants of the marketing mechanisms in a given subsector. 8 
2. Data Collection 
Information used to analyze the structure of the existing input and output networks in the 
agribusiness sector in Rwanda were gathered during October-November, 1993. The survey of 
both input and output dealers involved interviewing the managers of institutions or the 
proprietors of enterprises responsible for all purchases and sales. Data collected during the 
interviews covered information on the general characteristics of the institution or enterprise, the 
nature of its trade, contractual relations with product suppliers, contractual relations with clients, 
information about financial contracts, and assets and liabilities of the enterprise. The data on 
financial contracts includes information about informal lending to suppliers and clients, institu-
tional borrowing, deposits in institutions, informal borrowing from sources other than suppliers 
and clients, and deposits held in informal groups and with individual intermediaries. 
By surveying all types of economic agents--public and private--involved in the marketing 
process within each subsector, a reliable data set was constructed to describe and analyze the 
existing marketing systems and associated financial contracts in the agribusiness sector. The 
input distribution network is developing at a slow pace in Rwanda as will be discussed in greater 
detail In the following section. This input distribution network involves three subgroups. The 
first group consists of the three parastatal institutions involved in the importation and sale of 
agricultural inputs in Rwanda. The second group is a sub-sample of four randomly selected 
private entrepreneurs dealing with the importation, wholesale and retail trade of agricultural 
inputs. The third group is made up of a random sample of five non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) involved in input distribution, each with a different philosophy and operational system. 
Output marketing networks are somewhat more developed than input supply channels in 
Rwanda. The domestic trading of agricultural products involves only one parastatal institution, 
8 See Nagarajan and Meyer for details on the definitions of market mechanisms. 
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Output marketing networks are somewhat more developed than mput supply channels in 
Rwanda. The domestic trading of agricultural products involves only one parastatal institution, 
a few cooperatives, and many private traders at the wholesale and retail levels. This survey of 
output dealers involved primarily two subgroups in addition to the parastatal institution and two 
randomly selected cooperatives. These subgroups involve a total of 21 randomly selected 
wholesalers, 15 retailers and one cooperative. It is important to note, however, that these 
entrepreneurs were chosen within the specific output subsectors considered in the study--dry 
beans, potatoes, tomatoes and green beans--for reasons that will be discussed below. 
IV. Agricultural Input Networks 
Government intervention in agricultural input marketing is pervasive in Rwanda. The 
use of modern agricultural inputs, mainly fertilizer and pesticides, was originally introduced 
under grants from donor countries, largely through parastatal institutions. Unfortunately, this 
has meant continued government control of all fertilizer imports benefiting from large subsidies 
provided by the donor community, mainly EEC funds. Decreased land-holdings have put greater 
emphasis on the need to use mineral fertilizer as organic fertilizer has become insufficient to 
maintain soil fertility (World Bank, 1991). 
Most fertilizer that entered the Rwandan market in the 1980s was either provided through 
grants or purchased at subsidized prices, and handled by a division of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. As the demand for the use of agricultural chemicals grew (Table 12), the government in 
1985 instituted a separate department, APNI (Appui au Programme National Intrants), primarily 
to handle fertilizer and pesticide imports. The principal function of the APNI is to purchase 
(import) and market (distribute) mineral fertilizer and pesticides in Rwanda. Two other large 
parastatal institutions also import fertilizer primarily for their outgrowers. The OCIR-CAFE 
(Office des Cultures Industrielles au Rwanda-Coffee) is a government department responsible 
for the marketing of coffee and the OCIR-THE (Office des Cultures lndustrielles au Rwanda-
Tea) is another government department that operates state-owned tea plantations, purchases tea 
from outgrowers, processes tea leaves and exports black tea. 9 Given the subsidy structure 
characteristic of these parastatal institutions, it is not possible for any private entrepreneur in 
Rwanda to compete to import fertilizer. The domestic distribution system of fertilizer, however, 
seems to be changing slowly as explained below. Figure 1 portrays the vertical and horizontal 
linkages among the numerous agents and institutions comprising the current agricultural input 
network and the financial transactions that accompany the physical transactions. 
9 A fourth parastatal institution OPYRW A (Office du Pyrethrum au Rwanda) also started 
importing small amounts of fertilizer for the production of pyrethrum which is grown for 
industrial use as a lubricating oil. Given that these imports are small, they were not reported 
in the total statistics from government sources. 
Figure 1 . Input Channels for the Distribution of 
Agricultural Inputs in Rwanda in 1 9 9 3 .. 
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Table 12. Volume and Value of Fertilizer Imports in Rwanda: 1969-1993. 
Year 
(1) 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Source: 
a 
b 
Volume (Tons) Value (1000 FRW) Average price (FRW/kg.) 
(2) (3) (4)a 
531 
945 
1,544 
3,303 
2,731 
2,289 
835 
1,073 
1,411 
1,987 
325 
640 
456 
1,782 
623 
4,631 
4,121 
3,698 
1,695 
5,283 
7,000 
90 
7490 
5693 
17,500 
6525 
10371 
18114 
44167 
33803 
42576 
33167 
31369 
41700 
86871 
16436 
46892 
33914 
85049 
27803 
185710 
161366 
213911 
60639 
180066 
98918 
4568 
539,950 
740,817 
n.a. 
12 
11 
12 
13 
12 
19 
40 
29 
30 
44 
51 
73 
74 
48 
45 
40 
39 
58 
36 
34 
38 
5lb 
72b 
130b 
n.a 
BNR files; DSA, Etude sir !'Utilisation des Engrais Mineraux et des 
Pesticides au Rwanda, 1990. 
column (4) = column (3)/column (2) 
The high implicit prices estimated here for 1990-1993 (column 4) are unaccountably 
higher than the actual prices recorded in the markets during these years. 
1. Input Agents 
Fertilizer is sold at the wholesale level by the three parastatal institutions to different, 
although increasingly overlapping, clientele. The large pool of clients who purchase from 
APNI, OCIR-CAFE and OCIR-THE are private traders, non-governmental organizations, 
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agricultural cooperatives and farmers. Each institution and its system of operation will be 
discussed separately below. In addition to fertilizer, the APNI and OCIR-CAFE import pesti-
cides. The importation of pesticides by these parastatal institutions, in contrast to fertilizer, is 
much less subsidized than fertilizer. Pesticides are imported and sold at close to world market 
prices. With a growing demand for pesticides (Table 13), this has allowed some private 
entrepreneurs to expand their activities and engage in importation and sales. Some of these 
entrepreneurs are the same dealers who purchase fertilizer from the parastatal institutions. Table 
14 provides an account of the sample size, that is, the number of economic agents10 interviewed 
in the study and the inputs they market in Rwanda. 
Table 13. 
Year 
(1) 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Source: 
Volume and Value of Pesticide Imports in Rwanda: 1985-92. 
Volume (Tons) Value (1000 FRW) 
1,800 159,414 
2,120 168,655 
1,979 160,535 
1,593 269,227 
2,291 268,806 
2,599 264,219 
2,320 372,266 
842 366,836 
BNR files; DSA, Etude sir !'Utilisation des Engrais Mineraux et des 
Pesticides au Rwanda, 1990. 
10 The tenn economic agents refers to parastatal institutions, private entrepreneurs and non-
governmental institutions. 
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Table 14. Input Distribution Agents Sampled in Rwanda. 
Agent Type of Agent Inputs Trade Function 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
APNI Parastatal Fertilizer Importation & Wholesale 
Pesticide 
OCIR-CAFE Parastatal Fertilizer Importation & Wholesale 
Pesticide 
OCIR-THE Parastatal Fertilizer Importation & Wholesale 
AGROTECH Private Co. Fertilizer Wholesale & Retail; 
Pesticide Importation, Wholesale & Retail 
AGRIMAK Private Co. Fertilizer Wholesale & Retail 
Pesticide 
Entrepreneur Private Fertilizer Wholesale & Retail 
Enterprise Pesticide 
Entrepreneur Private Fertilizer Retail 
Enterprise Pesticide 
Projects NGO Fertilizer Retail; Grants 
Pesticide 
Source: OSU survey, 1993. 
To fully describe the picture of the input distribution system, Figure 1 illustrates the 
major distribution channels for fertilizer and pesticides. The two agricultural inputs considered, 
fertilizer and pesticides, are analyzed from their sources of origin through the importation, 
wholesale and retail channels until they reach final users. Each level of input trading involves 
a mixed set of economic agents, each operating with a different "raison d'etre". 
A. Import and Wholesale Distribution 
Fertilizer is imported into Rwanda by the three parastatal institutions, APNI, OCIR-
CAFE and OCIR-THE. All three benefitted this past year from an EEC subsidy that covered 
more than half the import cost of fertilizer and shipping costs to Rwanda. Previously, the APNI 
and OCIR-CAFE were the only recipients of this subsidy; however, in 1993 the OCIR-THE was 
able to benefit from EEC donor funds for the first time. The mechanism by which these 
institutions imported fertilizer in 1993, however, was the same. 
The parastatal institutions each identify the type and amount of fertilizer they need for 
the following season. The EEC determines the amounts to be supplied and the list of countries 
from whom it is possible to import. These countries are EEC member countries and ACP (African-
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Caribbean-Pacific) countriesY The parastatals order the fertilizer from overseas suppliers and 
negotiate their requests with the EEC. The data in Table 15 list the quantities of fertilizer 
requested and received by these institutions over the past three years. These data indicate that 
there has been no rationing in the amounts of fertilizer demanded. Suppliers ship the fertilizer 
to Rwanda and are paid in full directly by the EEC. Parastatal institutions in 1993 paid only 
about 46 percent of the total value and shipping cost of the fertilizer imported in Rwanda. The 
payments made by the APNI, OCIR-CAFE and OCIR-THE were paid through the respective 
parastatal accounts at the central bank (BNR) to an EEC development fund for Rwanda, also at 
the BNR. The average purchase price for these parastatal institutions was 35 FRW/kgY 
Table 15. Imports of Mineral Fertilizer in Rwanda by Parastatal Institutions (in 
tons): 1991-93. 
Institution 1991 1992 1993 
Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
APNI 5180 5180 547 547 6000 6000 
OCIR-THE 1560 1560 4099 4099 5500 5500 
OCIR-CAFE 0 0 133 133 6000 6000 
TOTAL 6740 6740 4778 4778 17,500 17,500 
Source: APNI files, 1993. 
Pesticides, in contrast to fertilizer, are imported by the parastatal institutions as well as 
by private entrepreneurs. This is possible because the subsidy at which these parastatals import 
pesticide is minimal. The overall price at which the APNI and OCIR-CAFE sell pesticides is 
close to the world market price which makes it feasible for private entrepreneurs to sell at 
comparable prices. The distribution techniques of fertilizer and pesticides by the various agents 
in the input system are, however, different. 
a) APNI 
APNI was established by the government of Rwanda in 1985 to deal with modem 
agricultural imports. Most of the fertilizer APNI sells has been purchased through the EEC 
subsidy; however, the APNI occasionally receives some grants particularly from Japan. 13 
Importation of fertilizer by donor funds, discussed above, imposes a condition on fertilizer sales 
11 Typically fertilizer has been imported from Mauritius, Belgium, Germany and Holland. 
12 One U.S. dollar is currently equivalent to 146.6 Rwandan Franc (FRW). 
13 In 1993 APNI received only 200 tons of fertilizer as a grant from Japan. 
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Importation of fertilizer by donor funds, discussed above, imposes a condition on fertilizer sales 
in Rwanda. The APNI like other parastatal institutions sells fertilizer at a price fixed much 
lower than the world market prices. This has meant that over the past decade the average price 
for fertilizer in Rwanda was about 30-45 FRW /kg when international prices were closer to 60 
FRW/kg. 
The APNI is based in the capital, Kigali, and does not operate any sales outlets anywhere 
else in the country. All the sales are conducted in its government building where it has a limited 
storage capacity of about 1000 tons. Thus, even though it receives imports on average twice 
a year, there is a storage problem. About 60 to 70 percent of the imported fertilizer is sold to 
retailers and 30 to 40 percent to wholesalers. APNI sells in quantities of 20, 50 and 100 tons 
to small and large traders who come from all over the country as well as to many NGOs. The 
retail price for a purchase of 20 to 50 tons, ranged between 40-45 FRW/kg. The wholesale 
price for 100 tons and more was about 30 FRW/kg in 1993. 
At least 50 percent of the fertilizer imported by APNI is sold to traders who in tum sell 
it in the northern part of the country. These sales are driven by the rapidly growing potato crop, 
which enjoys a much higher yield with applications of fertilizer and pesticides. Research results 
comparing the use of fertilizer and pesticides by potato growers in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire 
found that in a study of about 350 farmers in Rwanda, about two thirds (70 percent) used 
chemical fertilizers and the vast majority (93 percent) used fungicides (PNAP, 1993). This 
marketing of fertilizer is carried out mostly by private entrepreneurs in the north. 
All sales of fertilizer and pesticides made by the APNI are paid for in cash or by check. 
That is, there have been no credit sales by the APNI since 1991 when the institution experienced 
huge default problems from buyers. Given its state-enterprise status, the APNI was able to 
continue drawing on government funds and play a significant role in the distribution of fertilizer 
in the country despite these losses. 
b) OCIR-CAFE 
OCIR-CAFE was separated from OCIR--a parastatal institution that used to deal with 
both coffee and tea production--in 1974. As a public institution, its principal functions are the 
promotion of coffee production through the provision of modem agricultural inputs--such as 
fertilizer and pesticides--supervision, quality monitoring and marketing of coffee. OCIR-CAFE 
collects about 35,000 tons of arabica coffee per annum and sells it to RWANDEX, a private 
company which has a monopoly in coffee exports. OCIR-CAFE exports only about 600 tons 
of robusta coffee per annum through RW AND EX. OCIR-CAFE has been recently involved in 
the importation of fertilizer. The use of fertilizer was introduced in 1989 through a grant of 54 
tons in an attempt to improve coffee production. In 1990-92 OCIR-CAFE did not engage in the 
importation of fertilizer; it purchased fertilizer from the APNI to distribute to its out-growers. 
In 1993, however, OCIR-CAFE reentered the distribution network and imported about 6,000 
tons of fertilizer. 
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OCIR-CAFE has about 30 technicians in the field and 10 consultants to advise coffee 
outgrowers on the use of fertilizer. There are about 700,000 farmers who cultivate coffee in 
Rwanda and they typically purchased fertilizer through OCIR-CAFE agents in 20-50 kg. lots at 
45 FRW/kg. In addition to selling fertilizer to coffee outgrowers through its agents, OCIR-
CAFE auctioned off fertilizer to retailers and cooperatives in quantities of at least 50 ton lots 
at 40-45 FRW/kg. All sales were made in cash as OCIR-CAFE had also recorded huge defaults 
when offering credit to its clients in 1990-91. 
OCIR-CAFE buys other inputs (sacks, metal filters, pesticide sprayers, etc.) in addition 
to chemical fertilizer to facilitate its marketing process and encourage good production. In 1993 
OCIR-CAFE bought 400,000 sacks from RWANDAX and imported metal filters and spraying 
machines from Italy, Spain and France. The spraying machines were sold at a subsidized price 
of about 3,000 FRW to coffee outgrowers. OCIR-CAFE paid for these inputs using a letter of 
credit drawn at the BNR--for 1-3 months--where 30-80% of the total cost was paid by OCIR-
CAFE. That is, OCIR-CAFE received a partial subsidy from the EEC for the purchase of 
inputs other than fertilizer. 
c) OCIR-THE 
OCIR-THE is a parastatal institution which is responsible for the development of tea 
production and exports in Rwanda. There are about 25,000 tea outgrowers who contribute about 
55 percent of the total national tea production. In addition to providing assistance to tea 
outgrowers, OCIR-THE operates state-owned plantations--which contribute about 24 percent of 
national tea production, and has ten functioning tea factories in the country. 14 The remaining 
tea production is managed by agricultural cooperatives (15 percent) and a few large plantations 
(5 percent). The provision of assistance to tea outgrowers has mainly been in the form of 
fertilizer as tea production does not require the use of other modem agricultural inputs. The 
consumption of fertilizer in tea production is about 400 kg per hectare. 
OCIR-THE has imported fertilizer regularly at world market prices since 1984. 
Typically, once the suppliers are identified, a letter of credit is issued by the Central Bank 
(BNR) and charged to OCIR-THE's account. Thus, OCIR-THE covered the total cost of the 
fertilizer imported until last year. In 1993, for the first time, OCIR-THE benefitted from the 
EEC subsidy on fertilizer imports. Like its sister parastatal institutions, OCIR -CAFE and APNI, 
OCIR-THE was responsible for only 46 percent of the total value of fertilizer imports in 1993. 
OCIR-THE paid for these imports similar to APNI and OCIR-CAFE as discussed above. Up 
to last year, OCIR-THE was able to pay world market prices for fertilizer imports by charging 
prices higher than the Rwandan market price, because it supplies fertilizer to tea outgrowers on 
credit. OCIR-THE, as a monopsonist for tea, ensures good repayment of its loans by being able 
to control the sale of output from the tea-outgrowers through its processing facilities. 
14 OCIR-THE owns 17 tea factories in Rwanda; however, 7 of them were not in operation 
because they are located close to the northern borders where there was civil unrest. 
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The sale of fertilizer by OCIR-THE is provided on short-term credit only to small 
landholders and cooperatives. These in-kind loans cover the total value of fertilizer sold to 
farmers at production time at zero explicit interest rates. These loans are due at harvest when 
OCIR-THE collects payments in-kind in the fonn of tea. The loan contract on average covers 
the price of 45 kg per farmer given at the pnce that OCIR-THE purchases fertilizer plus 
transportation costs to the farm gate. As mentioned above, OCIR-THE has a monopsony on the 
purchase of tea from its outgrowers. Typically, OCIR-THE purchases tea from farmers at the 
farm gate and deducts the total value of the fertilizer loan from the price of output. Not 
surprisingly, the repayment rate on the fertilizer credit scheme was reported to be very good. 
d) Private entrepreneurs 
All fertilizer imports are controlled by parastatal institutions. The private sector plays 
no role at the import level (Figure 1). Pesticides, however, are imported by a few private 
entrepreneurs in the country in addition to the imports by APNI and OCIR-CAFE. Pesticides 
are imported from Europe, Mauritius, Pakistan and Kenya. The demand for pesticides has been 
increasing in the past few years. Thus, although the parastatal institutions receive a small 
subsidy from the EEC, private entrepreneurs have been able to compete in this market. 
Pesticides are imported by private entrepreneurs using letters of credit from one of the 
domestic commercial banks where they are regular customers. The letters of credit are typically 
for one to three months, granted at the on-going rate of interest with additional fee charges for 
the provision of this instrument. The same entrepreneurs, unable to compete with the subsidized 
import price of fertilizer, purchase fertilizer in wholesale, at about 32 FRW /kg, mostly from 
APNI in cash. Thus, as discussed earlier, there is no trade credit, advance payment or 
consignment in the sale of fertilizer by the parastatal institutions, except by OCIR-THE which 
sells only to tea outgrowers. 
Pesticides and fertilizer are bought and sold in both wholesale and retail by private 
entrepreneurs (Figure 1). Three private traders who were involved in wholesale and retail 
marketing of both fertilizer and pesticides were interviewed in this study. Some selected character-
istics of their business activities are discussed in Table 16. These traders have been involved 
in the sale of modem agricultural inputs for only two to four years. This is not surprising 
considering that the increased demand for both inputs evolved largely during the past few years. 
Most of these traders, however, have been in the private sector for a longer time and were 
involved in the marketing of other commodities. The volume of fertilizer handled by the 
individual trader ranged between 90 and 560 tons in the past year. 15 
15 It is difficult to document the volume of pesticides traded because of the mixed forms and 
measurements in which pesticides are traded. 
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Table 16. Selected Characteristics of Modern Agricultural Input Dealers (Import-
ers and Wholesalers) in Rwanda. 
Selected Characteristics 
Total number of traders interviewed 
Ave. number of years in input distribution 
Ave. volume of fertilizer traded per year 
Typical clients 
Second business 
Purchase price of fertilizer 
Form of purchase payment: 
Fertilizers 
Pesticides 
Sale price of fertilizer: 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Form of payment by buyers: 
Retailers 
NGOs 
Length of trade credit contracts 
Interest charges received 
Volume of credit transaction 
Collateral 
Source: OSU survey, 1993. 
Relevant Indicators 
3 
3 
300 Tons 
Retailers & NGOs 
Yes 
32-35 FRW/kg 
All cash 
Cash and letters of credit 
38-42 FRW /kg 
45-48 FRW/kg 
Mostly cash 
Mostly credit 
1-12 weeks 
0-30 percent 
1-80 tons of fertilizer 
None; confidence 
Wholesale marketing typically involves a small discount in price because of the reduced 
transaction costs and scale economies enjoyed by the suppliers. The wholesale price of fertilizer 
for sales of at least one ton was 38 FRW /kg; the wholesale price for smaller amounts of at least 
50 kg was 40 FRW/kg; and the retail price was about 45 FRW/kg for 1993. All wholesale and 
retail sales of both pesticides and fertilizer were reported to be in cash by the three private 
traders. The only exception was trade credit provided to NGOs. Traders considered NGOs a 
low risk group because they are supported by international organizations and, thus, are 
associated with minimal to no probability of loan default. Sales on credit to NGOs required no 
collateral; however, these contracts were reported by one entrepreneur to involve a mark-up in 
price which could reach as much as 30 percent. This is because such sales involve additional 
costs associated with giving a one to three months zero explicit interest supplier loan. The 
25 
wholesaling of fertilizer and pesticide did not involve any advance payments or sales on 
consignment for any of the cases discussed here. 
All three traders reported giving their employees advances on their salaries and only 
occasionally a loan to a friend. In addition, all three reported holding deposit accounts with one 
or more of the domestic commercial banks. As noted earlier, one of the traders who imports 
pesticides usually draws on a letter of credit from the Banque de Kigali (BK). Moreover, the 
other two traders have gained access to formal bank credit in the past three years. These loans 
were both medium-term, i.e. ranging between one and three years, at the on-going interest rate--
which is barely positive in real terms--and typically involved a title deed as collateral. Only one 
of these traders reported taking a very short -term informal loan from another trader during the 
past year. Finally, none of these traders were involved in Rotating Saving and Credit 
Associations (RoSCAs) known as tontines in Francophone Africa. 
B. Retail 
The parastatal institutions, OCIR-CAFE and OCIR-THE, retail modem agricultural inputs 
to their small scale outgrowers, as discussed above. This satisfies a large part of the demand 
for these inputs through the traditional supply leading channels. The other types of economic 
agents involved in the retail distribution network are private entrepreneurs, NGOs and 
agricultural cooperatives. 
a) Private entrepreneurs 
Private entrepreneurs have emerged in the past few years to play a role in the retailing 
of modem agricultural inputs. In addition to the three wholesalers discussed in the previous 
section, who sell both wholesale and retail, a fourth trader who is essentially a small retailer in 
rural areas was interviewed for this study. Like his fellow entrepreneurs, this trader has been 
involved in commerce for a long time but engaged in the distribution of fertilizer and pesticides 
only for the past two years. This trader reported purchasing a total of about 10 tons of fertilizer 
over the past year from a wholesaler in one of the secondary towns. Roughly half the weekly 
purchases he makes are on credit. This trade credit facility is offered on a weekly basis 
covering 60 percent of the total value of his purchases. On average he purchases about 200 kg 
of fertilizer per week at 44 FRW/kg which was reported to be the market price. There were 
no implicit interest charges reported and no collateral required by the wholesaler. 
The principal clients of this retailer are farmers. Unlike the wholesalers who also sell 
in retail markets, this retailer reported selling some fertilizer to farmers on credit. This 
represented about 35 percent of his sales with the other 65 percent in cash. The retail price 
reported was about 4 7 FRW /kg for both cash and credit sales since credit was given only for 
one week covering about half of the 15-30 kg sale transaction per customer. Since the retailer 
trusted his customers, no collateral was required. There were no sales made with advance 
payments or on consignment. This trader has never requested any formal loan from a 
commercial bank although he reported holding deposit accounts with two financial institutions. 
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However, short-term informal loans among fellow traders seem to be a common practice which 
is reciprocated among entrepreneurs at the same level of trade. Finally, this retailer reported 
having no interest in participating in RoSCAs. 
b) Non-government organizations 
Non-governmental organizations have become a popular conduit for donor assistance in 
the 1990s. Rwanda, like many other developing countries, has its share of NGOs operating in 
most sectors of the economy each with its own approach. Four of these organizations were 
visited in Rwanda to identify the role they play in the marketing of modern agricultural inputs. 
NGOs are involved mainly at the wholesale and retail levels of fertilizer distribution (Figure 1). 
The method of operation utilized by each of these organizations are reviewed briefly. 
i. PNAP 
The Programme National de la Pomrne de Terre (PNAP) is a research institution whose 
principal function is the development of potato production in Rwanda, Zaire and Uganda. The 
center aids in improving and disseminating new technologies for improving the quality of 
production. The regional office which extends services to these three countries is located in 
Ruhengeri in northern Rwanda which is close to the borders with these countries. The high 
ground plateaus and mountains in the region is also where potatoes are grown. Potato 
production will be discussed in more detail later. 
The PNAP purchases modem agricultural inputs, both fertilizer and pesticides, mainly 
for its own use in research. However, the PNAP has assisted in the development of farmers' 
awareness concerning the advantages of using fertilizer and pesticides in potato production. 
Table 17 reports the PNAP data which show a significant improvement in yields as a result of 
the use of modem agricultural inputs. These figures imply almost a five fold increase in yield 
as a result of the use of fertilizers and pesticides. To encourage farmers to use these inputs, the 
PNAP engages in limited purchases of fertilizer and pesticides on behalf of some groups of 
farmers in the north. In these cases, the PNAP requests advance payments at the time of making 
orders and then purchases these inputs for the farmers. 
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Table 17. Potato Yields With and Without Modern Inputs. 
Production technique: 
No modem inputs 
With organic fertilizer only 
With mineral fertilizer only 
With pesticides only 
With mineral fertilizer and fungicide only 
With mineral fertilizer, fungicide and improved varieties 
Source: PNAP, 1993. 
n. Projet Loiret 
Yield per hectare 
3-4 Tons 
5-6 Tons 
6 Tons 
12 Tons 
20 Tons 
25 Tons 
Projet Loiret is a French NGO operating in Butare in the southern part of Rwanda. We 
discuss the operations of this project in more detail in the non-traditional export section. 
However, this organization is also involved in the distribution of fertilizer and pesticides to its 
outgrowers of french beans and food crops. The project primarily promotes the production of 
french green beans for export to France. In the low-lands (marais) where green beans are 
grown, farmers also grow other domestic crops such as maize, cassava, dry beans, etc. Project 
Loiret provides modem inputs on credit to farmers growing domestically consumed crops but 
offers these inputs as grants to green bean outgrowers. Farmers producing green beans, 
however, are under a moral obligation to sell their produce to the project. Even if french bean 
farmers grow domestic crops, they are expected to repay the in-kind fertilizer and pesticide loans 
received for the production of domestic crops. In light of this confusing mix of in-kind grants 
and credit to the same producers, it is not surprising that this project has had many default 
problems with its in-kind loans. 
iii. UOM 
The "Unite Operationnelle de Masaka" (UOM) is a project initiated in 1982 that has been 
managed by the Mission Francaise de Cooperation. The principal function of this NGO is rural 
development. In an attempt to assist agricultural development, the project distributed modem 
inputs in 1990 to about 58 farmer groups formed by the project. The UOM purchased these 
inputs from the APNI and other private entrepreneurs in cash, using a revolving fund operated 
by the Mission Francaise de Cooperation. The project distributed these inputs on credit to the 
groups. In-kind credit was extended to the groups for one month. The inputs were stored in 
a shop run by an elected manager and sold in cash to farmers in the region. The project 
recorded poor repayment for inputs distributed on credit not because of farmer default--since 
they purchased fertilizer in cash--but due to embezzlement of farmer cash payments by managers 
and cashiers in the UOM stores. 
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iv. IWACU 
The "Centre de Formation et de Recherche Cooperatives IWACU" is a Swiss funded 
NGO, established in 1983, whose primary function is the provision of assistance to cooperatives 
in Rwanda. The principal types of assistance are training and consulting services provided to 
cooperative members. From 1986 through 1989, the IWACU was involved in the distribution 
of modern agricultural inputs, mainly fertilizer, through credit to agricultural cooperatives. The 
project, not surprisingly, experienced major default problems which led to its tennination. 
Currently, the IW ACU plays the role of brokering information to facilitate the purchase of 
modern inputs by cooperatives. This occurs when cooperatives sell their produce in Kigali and 
the IW ACU assists them in purchasing fertilizer. This system does not involve the IW ACU 
financing of these cooperatives; however, information provided by IWACU encourages the use 
of modern agricultural inputs. 
c) Agricultural cooperatives 
Agricultural cooperatives are very popular in Rwanda. Cooperatives sell modem inputs 
to farmers only at the retail level. The structural organization of cooperatives and their 
portfolios, however, differ. Some cooperatives purchase and sell inputs, while others sell their 
output and/or cultivate land collectively. The sale of modem inputs by cooperatives may be 
offered only to cooperative members or to the general public. In either case, the cooperatives 
benefit from subsidized wholesale prices when they purchase fertilizer in bulk and they make 
profits if they sell to the public at higher retail prices. One of the cooperatives that was 
interviewed in the survey indicated that it purchased fertilizer and pesticides from one of the 
private wholesalers in Kigali at the wholesale price. Cooperatives also receive subsidized prices 
for inputs from parastatal institutions such as OCIR-CAFE and OCIR-THE when they grow 
coffee and tea, respectively, on communal land. 
2. Financial Contracts 
Financial contracts that characterize the flow of commodities in the input channels are 
thin. At the importation level, the parastatal institutions make payments directly from their respec-
tive accounts at the BNR to a development fund sponsored by the EEC. Private entrepreneurs, 
however, who engage in the importation of pesticides use the typical letter of credit which is 
drawn at a domestic commercial bank. At the wholesale level, all parastatal institutions sell in 
cash to all types of clients except for OCIR-THE which sells fertilizer on credit to its 
outgrowers. 
Private entrepreneurs also sell in cash to most of their clients, both at the wholesale and 
retail levels, except for NGOs. Wholesalers sell modem inputs to NGOs on credit since they 
are considered reliable customers with an international donor guarantee. Finally at the retail 
level, most sales are in cash. Many NGOs, however, utilize different approaches to assist their 
clients resulting in confusing array of mechanisms in the sale of inputs. Some NGOs sell inputs 
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at different prices in cash, while others offer credit; still others take advance payments, and not 
surprisingly others provide grants to their cooperative or farmer clienteles. 
V. Agricultural Output Networks 
Rwanda was one of the few food self-sufficient countries in Sub-Saharan Africa during 
the past decade. This self-sufficiency was actually maintained by the 90 percent of the Rwandan 
people who live in rural areas and engage in agriculture with a strong subsistence bias. Hence, 
a large proportion of agricultural output was never marketed. This scenario has changed slightly 
over the past few years. Rwanda is not as self-sufficient now because population growth has 
been increasing. However, 90 percent of the Rwandan people continue to reside in rural areas 
and market only a small portion of their output. A recent study estimates the degree of commercializa-
tion of the 12 most important agricultural products in Rwanda (Loveridge, 1992). Among 
unprocessed products, about 35 percent of total potato production is sold, which makes it the 
most commercialized food crop in the country. However, given that Rwanda is least self-suffi-
cient in dry beans, the demand for bean imports induces an active trade in this crop. Only 77 
percent of the dry beans consumed in Rwanda are locally produced (Loveridge, 1992). Dry 
beans and potatoes are, therefore, among the most dynamic output subsectors in terms of trading 
activities. Both crops are classified as semi-perishables. 
Among the perishable crops fresh fruits and vegetables represent only two percent of the 
total volume of agricultural production (Table 11). These crops, however, represent a potential 
for export diversification, especially considering demand in European winter markets. 
Therefore, an examination of the marketing of these crops is strategic to the development of the 
agribusiness sector in Rwanda. Figure 2 lays out the vertical and horizontal linkages comprising 
the fmancial flows and marketing network for agricultural products in Rwanda. 
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Figure 2. Output Channels for the Distribution 
of Agricultural Output in Rwanda in 1993. 
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1. Output Agents 
Our study of the distribution of outputs through alternative channels is based on the same 
subsector methodology outlined earlier. Output networks, contrary to input channels, are more 
dependent on the specific subsector or product rather than the type of economic agent or 
institution handling the sale of these products. The following sections deal with the marketing 
of four crops: dry beans, potatoes, tomatoes and green beans. The various economic agents 
involved in the marketing of these commodities are identified in Figure 2. The production units 
are primarily the small-holder farmers and agricultural cooperatives; the marketing agents are 
wholesalers, middlemen/truckers, a parastatal institution which also sells in retail markets; and 
finally the retailers who sell directly to consumers. Some of these agents are more active in 
certain subsectors than others which will be attributed to a number of factors in subsequent 
discussions. Table 18 details the types of agents involved in the output marketing network, their 
suppliers and customers by sub sector. 
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Table 18. Agricultural Output Agents Sampled in Selected Subsectors in Rwanda. 
Subsector Agent Type Sample Suppliers Customers 
Size 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I) Dry Beans a) OPROVIA Parastatal 1 Wholesalers Public sector 
Truckers Wholesalers 
Farmers Retailers 
b) Wholesalers Private 10 Truckers Retailers 
Farmers Consumers 
OPROVIA 
II) Potatoes a) OPROVIA Parastatal 1 Truckers Retailers 
Farmers Consumers 
b) Wholesalers Private 6 Truckers Retailers 
Farmers Consumers 
Ill) Perishable Fruits a) Truckers Private 4 Farmers Retailers 
& Vegetables 
b) Retailers Private 15 Truckers Consumers 
Farmers 
c) Cooperative Private 1 Farmer-mem- Consumers 
hers 
Source: OSU survey, 1993. 
A. OPROVIA 
OPROVIA (Office pour la Commercialisation des Produits Viviers, des Intrants Agricoles 
et des Production Animates au Rwanda) is a public institution that was established in 1975. It 
is the only parastatal institution that deals with the marketing of agricultural products and 
occasionally the distribution of agricultural inputs. The distribution of agricultural inputs was 
carried out in some years in conjunction with APNI. OPROVIA, however, did not engage in 
the downstream distribution of modern agricultural inputs during 1993 since there was 
competition by the private sector. 
OPROVIA is involved mainly in the marketing of non-perishable food products and semi-
perishable crops. The non-perishable food products, such as flour, rice and cooking oil, are 
imported and sold in both the wholesale and retail markets. The second category of semi-
perishable crops, such as dry beans, potatoes and sorghum, are purchased from wholesalers, 
middlemen or directly from farmers. 
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There are three harvest periods for dry beans in Rwanda. The first and largest harvest 
is in January-February which comprises about 75 percent of the total national production; the 
second, medium sized harvest occurs in June-July which comprises about 20 percent of the total 
production; and the third and smallest harvest is spread throughout the year in the marais (i.e. 
drained wetland valleys) which comprise only five percent of the total production. OPROVIA 
purchases dry beans generally during the first harvest. The annual purchases by OPROVIA total 
between 3,500 and 4,500 tons. This varies depending on the total volume of the harvest and the 
storage capacity available at OPROVIA's facilities. 
The principal suppliers of OPROVIA (80 percent) are the private middlemen/ truckers 
who purchase from farmers for sales to OPROVIA and other wholesalers. OPROVIA buys 
about 20 percent of its stock directly from farmers and occasionally from wholesalers. 
Purchases are made at 15 field offices that OPROVIA operates throughout the country. All 
purchases made by OPROVIA were reported to be paid for in cash or by check. Suppliers who 
sell to OPROVIA, however, reported that in some cases they received payments a month after 
delivery of their crops. This implies that OPROVIA receives some short-term trade credit from 
its suppliers. The average purchase price was reported to be 35 FRW/kg but varied between 
30-37 FRW/kg. 
OPROVIA sells mostly (75 percent) at the wholesale level to public service institutions, 
such as the army, prisons, hospitals, and schools. Sales to the general public are made in both 
wholesale and retail markets. The mode of payment by the general public is always cash. 
Public institutions, however, are typically billed which involves up to a one month lag to con-
summate payments. Sale prices vary depending on supplies in the market. In 1993, when 
supplies were short for a period of time, OPROVIA reported selling dry beans for 65 FRW /kg--
previously purchased at 35 FRW/kg--at the time when the market price was 80 FRW/kg. 
Typically, OPROVIA's retail prices are 10 percent higher than its wholesale prices. 
OPROVIA has been involved in the marketing of potatoes since 1988. The total volume 
of potatoes that OPROVIA stocks and trades is about 750 tons per annum. The potatoes are 
purchased mostly from the northern part of country (Gisenyi and Ruhengeri regions) where 
potatoes are grown and the sales are concentrated in Kigali. Potatoes are purchased mostly from 
farmers and cooperatives at about 14 FRW/kg. Sales occur almost exclusively in retail 
consumer markets at about 18 FRW/kg. Prices, however, vary depending on the season. 
OPROVIA reported purchasing potatoes from truckers and farmers in cash and selling to 
consumers only in cash. 
B. Wholesalers 
Wholesalers are at the junction of the marketing channel that links producers and 
consumers. They are typically traders who operate small scale enterprises, own or rent a store, 
hire a few employees--either on a permanent or temporary basis--and engage in the trade of one 
or more lines of products. There is another type of small wholesaler, who operates in some 
cases between farmers and the store-wholesalers. These are the middlemen/truckers, i.e. traders 
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who basically purchase products from fanners and deliver them to wholesalers in fixed locations 
or to retailers. Often the degree to which one type of agent dominates the marketing channel 
is explained by the subsector, i.e. the type of crop in question and the size of total production. 
Hence, the following subsections will discuss each group of wholesalers by the major type of 
product they trade. 
a) Dry beans 
Dry beans are a major staple in the Rwandan diet. Private wholesalers are the agents 
who play a dominant role in this market. They are typically proprietors of small scale 
enterprises. Ten entrepreneurs in this group were interviewed to gather data on the nature of 
their operation, their contracts with their suppliers and customers, and the nature of the financial 
services they use. Table 19 presents data that describes this group of entrepreneurs and the 
nature of their contracts. 
Most traders in the sample have been involved in marketing dry beans from 2 to 15 years 
(8 years on average). These traders are all proprietors of their small scale businesses where they 
hire on average five employees, including both full and part-time. Sixty percent of this group 
rent their stores and 70 percent own at least one truck which they use for transporting 
commodities. 
Farmers, truckers and occasionally OPROVIA are the principal suppliers for dry bean 
wholesalers. Domestic production, however, is insufficient as mentioned above. Thus, regional 
imports mainly from Zaire are one of the supply sources transported by truckers. As expected, 
the purchase price from the farm gate was lower than the price offered by truckers; however, 
the price offered by Zairian truckers was more competitive than the domestic price. 16 Traders 
typically purchase dry beans about three times per week. The volume handled by these traders 
vary from 20 to 80 tons per month. This depends on the amount of storage space available to 
the trader. The majority of purchases were reported to be in cash; however, most traders (70 
percent) reported gaining access to trade credit occasionally from their S1Jppliers to finance a 
small portion (about 10 percent) of their purchases. 
Trade credit contracts are typically short-term, small sized loans, with no reported 
interest charges or price mark-ups. They are often given with no collateral, or against post-
dated checks and, in some cases, involve a signed contract between traders. In short, the 
average loan size covers about 4 tons of output, is extended for an average of 3 days and paid 
largely in full at maturity. A few traders also reported giving advances to their suppliers 
especially between harvests to guarantee access to produce. These contracts also include a small 
16 It was difficult to determine the exact price at which commodities were traded throughout 
the year, given the price fluctuations especially for dry beans. However, the price range was 
between 40 and 70 FRW/Kg. The reported price offered by Zairian truckers was 38 FRW/Kg. 
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advance covering a few tons of produce, given for a very short-term, on average 3 days, and 
typically with no guarantee. 
Table 19. Selected Characteristics of Dry Beans Wholesalers in Rwanda. 
Selected Characteristics 
Sample Size 
Ave. number of years of experience 
Owner of a store 
Owner of a vehicle 
Ave. number of employees 
Types of suppliers 
Ave. frequency of purchase 
Ave. volume of stock 
Price range 
Form of payment 
Characteristics of purchase credit 
contract 
Type of customers 
Price 
Form of payment 
Characteristics of sale credit contracts 
Gives informal loans 
Receives informal loans 
Received a formal loan 
Holds deposit account 
Participates in Tontines 
Source: OSU survey, 1993. 
Relevant Indicators 
10 
8 years 
40% 
70% 
5 
Truckers; Farmers; OPROVIA 
3 times/week 
20-80 tons/month 
38-70 FRW /kg 
Cash: (90%) 
Credit: (10%) 
Advance payment: occasionally between harvests 
Ave. size: 4 tons; 
Length: 3 days; 
Interest Charges: 0% ; 
Collateral: post-dated check or none. 
Retailers: (80%) 
Consumers: (20%) 
40-70 FRW/kg 
Cash, credit or advance payments 
Ave. size: 4 tons; 
Length: 3-7 days; 
Interest Charges: 0% ; 
Collateral: post-dated cheque or none. 
80% 
80% 
50% 
100% 
30% 
Wholesale traders sell in large part to retailers (almost 80 percent), to consumers, and 
occasionally to OPROVIA. Prices were reported to vary between 40 and 70 FRW /kg depending 
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on the season. Most sales are made in cash; however, trade credit is granted on occasion to 
trustworthy clients. These credit contracts were reported to be given on average twice per 
month, covering about 4 tons of produce, maturing in one week at which time the balance (50-
100 percent) is due. Advance payments were also reported to be made occasionally by some 
customers typically for one to two days covering about 50 percent of the total value of the 
contract. 
Financial contracts in which wholesalers were engaged were not principally made up of 
the limited trade credit they demanded and/or supplied. In fact, this type of financial instrument 
seems to represent a smaller portion of the overall financial services wholesalers utilize. Other 
types of financial contracts that wholesalers reported using include receiving and offering 
informal loans from and to other traders, formal loans from commercial banks, and participation 
in tontines. Informal loans are a popular source of short-term finance used by the majority (80 
percent) of the wholesalers in the sample. The amount of these loans varied from 30,000 to 
1,000,000 FRW, given for periods ranging from a few days to three months, with no interest 
charges or collateral requirements. The demand for and supply of these informal loans was 
based on reciprocity between traders. Informal loans, however, are not the only type of 
informal finance that traders used in addition to trade loans. The Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (RoSCAs) are widely used by only some of these traders (30 percent). The tontines 
included a mixed gender membership in two out of the four tontines documented among these 
wholesalers. Contributions were made on a weekly or monthly basis. Weekly contributions 
ranged from 3,000 FRW to 5,000 FRW and monthly contributions ranged from 1,200 FRW to 
6,000 FRW. 
Wholesalers were also active customers of formal financial institutions. All the traders 
in this sample hold deposit accounts with at least one of the commercial banks in the country. 
Thus, it is not surprising to find that about half have demanded and gained access to formal 
loans in the past few years. These loans varied from 200,000 to 4,000,000 FRW all granted for 
a period of one year, at the current nominal interest (11-15 percent), and all secured by property 
collateral. Wholesalers, therefore, seem to be quite active in accessing various formal and 
informal financial contracts. What seems more atypical of this group of traders in Rwanda, 
compared to traders elsewhere, is the limited amounts of trade credit they receive from their 
suppliers and grant to their customers. 
b) Potatoes 
The rapid increase in potato production in Rwanda in the past few years has contributed 
to an expansion in the marketing network servicing this crop. The enhanced potato yields 
resulting from the increased use of modem inputs in rich volcanic soils has permitted exports 
to neighboring countries. These factors present a promising potential for the promotion of 
regional exports versus concentrating efforts on exports to the European market. The marketing 
of potatoes is conducted largely by private entrepreneurs. OPROVIA, as discussed earlier, plays 
a minor role in the sale of potatoes to consumers in Kigali. 
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Table 20. Selected Characteristics of Potato Wholesalers in Rwanda. 
Selected Characteristics 
Sample Size 
Number of years of experience 
Owner of a store 
Owner of a vehicle 
Ave. number of employees 
Types of suppliers 
Frequency of purchase 
Ave. volume of each purchase 
Price range 
Form of payment 
Characteristics of purchase credit contract 
Type of customers 
Price 
Form of payment 
Characteristics of sale credit contract 
Gives informal loans 
Receives informal loans 
Received a formal loan 
Holds deposit account 
Participates in Tontines 
Source: OSU survey, 1993. 
Relevant Indicators 
6 
3- 20 years 
50% 
100% 
4 
Truckers; Farmers 
3 times/week 
66 tons/month 
18-23 FRW/kg 
Cash; Credit; Advance payments 
Ave. size: 2 tons; 
Length: 2-7 days; 
Interest Charges: 0%; 
Collateral: none. 
Retailers: 80% 
Consumers: 20% 
18-24 FRW/kg 
Cash; Credit; Advance payments 
Ave. size: 2 tons; 
Length: 7 days; 
Interest Charges: 0% ; 
Collateral: none. 
100% 
100% 
60% 
83% 
30% 
Wholesale activities originate from Ruhengeri, in the northern part of the country, where 
traders purchase potatoes from farmers. The market for potatoes, however, has been growing 
and expanding from Rwanda to Burundi, Uganda and Zaire. Potatoes are often sold by 
wholesalers in both small wholesale and retail markets. Wholesalers, therefore, are the principal 
agents in the marketing of this crop. One of the largest potato growers in the north is also the 
principal wholesale distributor of fertilizer in the region. Six potato wholesalers were 
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interviewed in our study. The data presented in Table 20 describes the nature of these 
operations and the contracts that the potato wholesalers utilize in their transactions. 
Wholesalers seem to have emerged recently in this subsector as trading in potatoes 
became increasingly attractive. The number of years that entrepreneurs have engaged in this 
activity range from 3 to 20, indicating the more recent entrants versus the incumbents in the 
market. These entrepreneurs are all proprietors, who own large trucks for transporting goods, 
with 50 percent owning the stores where they purchase and sell their stock, and hire 4 employees 
on average. 
The principal suppliers of potatoes are farmers and middlemen traders (truckers). All 
the wholesalers in the sample reported purchasing stocks from both types of suppliers. The 
prices at the farm gate (roughly 18 FRW/kg) were lower than those offered by the truckers (20-
23 FRW /kg). Given the semi-perishability of potatoes, wholesalers made purchases of about 66 
tons, on average three times per week. Payments were made mostly in cash. Only one third 
of these traders reported access to trade credit from their suppliers. These contracts were 
similar to the occasional trade credit documented among the dry bean wholesalers. They 
typically cover only a small amount of produce (12 tons on average), given for a short period 
of time (2 to 7 days), with a 50 to 80 percent down payment and no collateral. Occasional 
advance payments were made to farmers by these wholesalers to guarantee access to stocks 
during deficit seasons. 
Wholesalers sell in large part to retailers (80 percent) and directly to consumers. Sale 
prices were reported to vary, depending on the season, between 18 and 24 FRW /kg. The 
majority of sales (80 percent) were in cash. Occasional trade credit (1-2 contracts/month), 
however, was given to trustworthy retailers as reported by some wholesalers (60 percent). 
These contracts are again short term (one week on average), covering about 2 tons of produce, 
given with a 50 percent down payment and no collateral. Advance payments were also reported 
by two traders. These involved occasional contracts--once or twice per month--with 50 to 100 
percent down payment for 1 to 2 days. 
Reciprocal informal loans were reported by all traders in the sample. These loans ranged 
from 20,000 to 250,000 FRW given for a few days with no interest charges or collateral. 
Informal financial contracts in the form of RoSCAs were also reported to be a source of 
financing business activities among this group of wholesalers. Thirty percent of these traders 
reported participating in tontines where the majority of members are men, and contributions 
range between 7,000 FRW per month or 1,100 FRW per week. Formal financial services were 
also used by these wholesalers. The majority (83 percent) reported holding deposits at formal 
financial institutions. More than half of this group of traders (60 percent) reported receiving 
formal loans from domestic commercial banks to finance their operations. These loans varied 
from 1 to 6 million FRW, given for periods of 1 to 3 years at interest rates varying from 10 to 
15 percent and secured by a title to real estate. 
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c) Perishable Fruits and Vegetables 
The major perishable fruits and vegetables analyzed in this study that are traded in 
wholesale markets are tomatoes and bananas. Four economic agents who trade in these crops 
were interviewed in the survey (Table 21). One of the units is an association of 22 traders who 
operate as a cooperative and sell tomatoes wholesale. The wholesalers discussed in this sub-
sector are truckers who purchase and sell stocks directly from their vehicles. This practice is 
explained by the degree of perishability of the crops in question. Given the lack of refrigeration 
facilities, there are no wholesalers who store fresh fruits and vegetables in shops. Bananas are 
sometimes harvested green and stored by microentrepreneurs for future use in processing banana 
beer. The time of the survey, however, coincided with the growing period between banana 
harvests when trading activity was minimal. 
None of the tomato or banana wholesalers owned the trucks used for their trading 
activities and none employed permanent labor. They all purchased directly from farmers on a 
daily basis, stored the products on the truck overnight and sold them to retailers in the market 
the following day. The average quantity purchased by these wholesalers was 2 tons per day 
which they paid for largely in cash. Occasional trade credit (i.e. consignment of produce 
without payment) was provided by farmers for a part of the contract until the following day if 
the traders were short of cash. No advance payment (i.e. forward contracting) was reported by 
these traders to secure access to produce. 
Wholesalers sell to retailers in the market at sunrise before consumers arrive to purchase 
their fruits and vegetables. Sales are mostly in cash; however, truckers supply some trade credit 
(10 to 15 percent of total sales) to their customers. These contracts cover very small quantities 
of produce, with about 25 to 50 percent of the total value of the contract given as a down 
payment and the balance completed the next day. No interest charges, or price mark-ups, were 
reported with the provision of these contracts, and no collateral was required. 
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Table 21. Selected Characteristics of Perishable Fruits and Vegetablea Wholesalers 
in Rwanda. 
Selected Characteristics 
Sample Size 
Owner of a store 
Owner of a vehicle 
Ave. number of employees 
Types of suppliers 
Frequency of purchase 
Ave. volume of stock 
Form of payment 
Characteristics of purchase credit contract 
Type of customers 
Form of payment 
Characteristics of sale credit contract 
Gives informal loans 
Receives informal loans 
Received a formal loan 
Holds deposit account 
Participates in Tontines 
Source: OSU survey, 1993. 
Relevant Indicators 
4 
None 
None 
None 
Farmers 
Daily 
2 tons/day 
Cash; Credit 
Length: 1 day; 
Interest Charges: 0; 
Collateral: none 
Retailers 
Cash; Credit 
Length: 1 day; 
Down payment: 25-50% 
Interest Charges: 0; 
Collateral: none 
75% 
75% 
50% 
75% 
75% 
a The perishable fruits and vegetables traded in wholesale and discussed in this study 
are tomatoes and bananas. 
This group of wholesalers, in contrast to the larger and more established wholesalers who 
deal in semi-perishables, utilize few formal financial services. On the one hand, only 75 percent 
of this group reported holding deposit accounts with a commercial bank and only 50 percent had 
requested and obtained a formal loan. These formal loans were also smaller than those acquired 
by the semi-perishable wholesalers. The average loan size was 40,000 FRW given for an 
average period of six months, at the on-going interest rate and secured by title to property. Participa-
tion in informal financial markets, on the other hand, was frequent. The majority of traders (75 
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traders (75 percent) received and granted informal loans to other traders based .on. reciprocity 
in amounts which ranged from 20,000 to 120,000 FRW. Moreover, the maJOrity of these 
traders (75 percent) participated regularly in tontines. These tontines, in contrast to those among 
semi-perishable wholesalers, had an almost equal proportion of male and female members. 
Contributions in the tontines reported by this group were made on a weekly basis with an 
average amount of about 2,000 FRW. 
C. Retailers 
Five retail markets operate in and around the capital, Kigali. Various consumer 
commodities, ranging from clothing to food products, are sold in these markets. Fresh fruit and 
vegetable retailers purchase products from middlemen who sell from their trucks or purchase 
directly from farmers who come to these markets. Some retailers are also fanners who sell a 
portion of their produce in the market. The sale of tomatoes and green beans was examined in 
these retail channels for horticultural crops. Tomatoes were among the most abundant 
vegetables in the market and green beans represent an interesting crop because of their export 
potential. 
A total of 15 retailers were interviewed during the survey (Table 22). Two thirds of 
these traders are women. There seem to be few differences in the operations of these traders 
except for their sources of supply. Tomatoes, on the one hand, are supplied mainly by whole-
salers who operate trucks and to some extent by farmers. Green beans, on the other hand, are 
supplied mainly by farmers, and are sold by some producers in the market and to a very limited 
extent by traders. 17 Prices of both crops varied depending on the supply and competition in 
the market. The method of payment was mostly cash, except for occasional one day credit, 
covering a partial amount of the stock. The principal buyers were private consumers and sales 
were mainly in cash. One day credit contracts were occasionally given for regular established 
customers if short of cash. Advance payments, however, were not reported to be given by these 
retailers to their suppliers nor did they generally receive any advances from their customers. 
Retailers rely mainly on retained earnings and informal finance to finance their 
operations. None of the 15 retailers reported ever requesting or receiving formal loans. 
However, almost all the retailers (93 percent) participated regularly in tontines. Most of these 
groups made contributions on a daily basis and a few had weekly rotations. The amounts ranged 
between 100 and 500 FRW and the rotations were often determined by lottery. Informal loans 
among retailers were also reported by about 50 percent of this group. These loans ranged from 
200 to 2000 FRW and were based on reciprocity. Thus, the information collected from retailers 
confmns that trade credit is limited within the marketing channels from wholesalers to retailers 
to consumers. The most common financial arrangements are cash purchases and sales followed 
by informal loans made and received by the same type of economic agents, generally based upon 
reciprocity. 
17 Only one retailer reported purchasing from a trader. 
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Table 22. Selected Characteristics of Perishable Vegetablea Retailers in Rwanda. 
Selected Characteristics 
Sample Size 
Types of suppliers 
Frequency of purchase 
Form of payment 
Type of customers 
Form of payment 
Gives informal loans 
Receives informal loans 
Received a formal loan 
Participates in Tontines 
Source: OSU survey, 1993. 
Relevant Indicators 
15 
Truckers; Farmers; Own-Production 
Daily 
Cash 
Consumers 
Cash 
50% 
50% 
0% 
93% 
a The perishable vegetables considered in the study are tomatoes and green beans. 
D. Cooperatives 
Agricultural cooperatives, as noted earlier, are very popular in Rwanda. Among the 
various cooperatives, one in particular was identified in this study as being active in the 
production and sale of horticultural crops. This cooperative has operated for about 20 years and 
is located in the peri-urban region around Kigali. Members of the cooperative (130 in total) 
grow various vegetables and fruits, such as green beans, tomatoes, carrots and onions, that are 
sold in a store the cooperative rents and operates in the city. The cooperative purchases crops 
three times per week only from farmer-members on a monthly supplier credit basis. That is, 
no down payment is made to the farmers at the time of purchase. The total quantity of crops 
is noted and the farmer signs a contract agreeing to receive the total payment at the end of the 
month. 
The cooperative sells in its store mostly to private consumers. Sales have been made 
exclusively in cash for the past five years since the cooperative committee decided to stop all 
credit even to regular customers. One public program (an orphanage), however, purchases 
reflllarly from the cooperative on weekly basis with a credit arrangement. The orphanage 
receives a three month credit facility with no interest charges. The cooperative does not receive 
advance payment from any of its customers, nor does it sell on consignment. 
The cooperative has a deposit account with the Banque Populair (BP) and acquired a 1 
million FRW loan from this bank during 1993. The loan was given for a period of six months 
at 13 percent interest with a title to real estate property used as collateral. Some of the 
cooperative members (20) have also formed a tontine. The tontine brings together mostly men 
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farmers--there are only two women among the tontine members--with monthly contributions of 
600 FRW where the rotation is, interestingly, determined by last name in alphabetical order. 
This cooperative is the only economic unit which receives its produce on credit (i.e no interest 
supplier credit from its farmer-members). However, since this credit is granted by the 
shareholders (i.e farmers) it is not quite the typical trade credit that is granted by wholesalers 
to retailers or by producers to retailers. 
2. Financial Contracts 
Financial contracts vary among the different agents in the Rwandan output marketing 
channels. The principal difference is the level of marketing, i.e. wholesale versus retail. 
Formal fmancial contracts are quite common among wholesalers, both in the form of loans and 
deposits, but they are almost non-existent among retailers. With respect to informal finance, 
as in the input networks, there is little trade credit flowing within the output marketing channels. 
Among the four subsectors considered, trade credit is most commonly observed among semi-
perishables, especially the potato trade. The relative thinness of the vertical trade credit linkages 
may be contrasted with the abundance of the horizontal informal fmancial contracts among 
traders at the same stage in the marketing channel. That is, there exists a large amount of 
informal loans reciprocated among traders in the wholesaler group and similarly among traders 
in the retailer groups. Moreover, tontines are also popular among traders in each of these two 
groups. It can be concluded, therefore, that credit is not an important factor used to stimulate 
transactions among the various stages between producers and consumers. Rather it is popular 
among homogenous agents as a way to generate liquidity which may be used for a variety of 
purposes in addition to facilitating their trading operations. Therefore offering credit does not 
seem to be a major marketing tool among these agents. 
VI. Non-traditional Agricultural Exports 
Non-traditional agricultural exports in Rwanda principally consist of vegetables, fruits, 
flowers and ornamental plants. These new export products have only emerged in the past two 
years and they represent only little more than one percent of total agricultural exports (Table 9). 
Coffee is the leading agricultural export product, accounting for about 70 percent, while tea is 
in second place with about 27 percent. Horticultural export crops, namely apple bananas, french 
green beans and potatoes, represent about 0.5 percent of total agricultural exports. As noted 
earlier, the share of fresh fruits and vegetables in agricultural production is only about 2 percent 
(Table 11). Given this thin production base and small export activity, it was not difficult to 
identify the economic agents involved in non-traditional agricultural exports. Essentially two 
types of economic agents are currently involved in the export of horticultural crops from 
Rwanda. 
The first exporter of non-traditional agricultural crops is the Project Loiret-Butare, 
discussed earlier, which is a French NGO involved in the export of green beans to France. The 
project was initiated in 1987 with reclamation of 87 hectares of swamp low-lands for agricultural 
production in Butare, Southern Rwanda. The project receives an annual subsidy from the Loiret 
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department in France to cover its operational costs. This initiative involves a group of local 
farmers who cultivate other subsistence crops in addition to green beans. The project provides 
extension services and quality control for green beans grown on about 30 hectares of project 
area, and provides fertilizer and pesticides free of charge. Fanners, however, are under an 
obligation to sell green beans to the project at 35 FRW/kg, a price set by the Ministry of 
Agriculture five years ago. 
The project monitors the production of green beans and supervises farmers at harvest 
time. The farmers harvest the crop early in the morning and the project takes responsibility for 
packaging the beans, loading them on trucks, transporting them on a two hour trip to Kigali and 
shipping them by air to France. The whole operation is completed in one day, so the lack of 
refrigeration facilities in Rwanda does not affect the quality of green bean exports; however, it 
clearly requires tight coordination and rapid scheduling from harvest to shipping to meet airline 
schedules and to avoid spoilage. 
The green beans are sold at about 18 FF/kg in France. The major component of total 
costs is shipping which is about 8 FF /kg by air. Production costs were estimated by the project 
at about 2-3FF/kg. The NGO/project manager reported losses for the first three years 1988-90; 
however, since 1991 the project has been able to make some profits. A wholesaler in Paris has 
been purchasing the Loiret-Butare green beans on consignment for the past three years. The 
project produces about 150 tons annually. The wholesaler benefits from a 10-15 percent price 
margin following French price regulations. At the end of each month or two, the wholesaler 
sends a wire transfer payment for past consignments to the project manager in Kigali at one of 
the commercial banks. In effect, the project provides one to two months supplier credit to the 
French wholesaler marketing the beans in France. 
The second exporter of non-traditional agricultural crops is a private entrepreneur who 
has been involved mainly in the export of apple bananas to Switzerland since 1991. Other than 
this export activity, the entrepreneur operates a packaging business that allows him to self-
finance his export costs. This entrepreneur, in contrast to the Loiret project, is not involved in 
the production of the crop exported. He manages the export operation by purchasing quality 
bananas one week in advance from outgrowers, 18 hires trucks to pick up the crop on the 
delivery day from producers, collects the bananas and sorts out the export quality in one day, 
and, finally, ships them the next day by air to Paris and then to Geneva. Bananas of lower 
quality are sold in the local market. The sale of export bananas, similar to green beans, is on 
consignment. The entrepreneur reported minimal losses due to the rejection of shipments. The 
bananas are harvested green which allows them about 7 days maturity before they reach the 
supermarkets in Switzerland in a ripened state. 
The entrepreneur started with shipments of about one ton/week for the first year; 
however, he has been making weekly shipments of 2 tons to his counterpart in Switzerland for 
18 The entrepreneur reported that he has agreements with about 100 outgrowers. 
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the past year. The Swiss importer pays the Rwandan entrepreneur through a wire transfer to 
one of the local commercial banks on average at the end of each month. Therefore, this 
entrepreneur is providing a one month supplier credit to the Swiss wholesaler. The entrepreneur 
reported that he is not making much profit since he receives only 1.25 FS/kg FOB from a sale 
price of 11-12 FS/kg in Geneva. However, since this is only the second year of operation, the 
entrepreneur considers this still a promotional stage. The entrepreneur is currently planning to 
expand his business to contract farmers to grow green beans for export. The plan is to provide 
inputs and technical advice to the farmers, and market the output in European markets. 
These two cases represent the only initiatives discovered for non-traditional agricultural 
exports in Rwanda. Although very limited, these case studies provide insights into the strengths 
and weaknesses of the non-traditional agricultural exports in the country. 
Vll. Constraints on the Development of the Agri-business Sector 
The input and output marketing networks in the agri-business sector in Rwanda were 
examined in this study. Several factors influence the market mechanisms that predominate in 
these systems. The factors that shape these market mechanisms include asset specificity, 
production uncertainty, market uncertainty, access to fmancial markets and access to informa-
tion.19 The following discussion assesses how these factors influence the structure and 
performance of the input and output subsectors examined in this study. 
1. Input Systems 
The input distribution networks in Rwanda evolved largely over the past decade primarily 
due to donor and government intervention. The input distribution system today continues to be 
largely dependent upon this intervention. The supply agents are mainly parastatal institutions 
that control the imports of fertilizer at subsidized prices. The substantial intervention into the 
supply of fertilizer in Rwanda made a major impact on how the existing marketing system has 
emerged. 
At the import level, the fertilizer subsector in Rwanda is clearly at a pre-market stage. 
The pre-market stage describes the prevailing market structure where the existing institutions for 
the most part operate on a supply-leading approach, rather than demand driven, and provide in-
kind subsidies to promote the development of agriculture. The only exception to this is OCIR-
THE which presumably was importing fertilizer at world market prices before 1993, providing 
fertilizer to tea outgrowers on credit, recording good repayment rates, and making profits from 
19 See Nagarajan and Meyer for a complete discussion of the impact of these factors on 
market mechanisms. 
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its sales. This marketing mechanism is similar to a resource providing contract20 where OCIR-
THE, a state-owned enterprise, provides inputs and market outlets for tea producers. OCIR-
THE, however, does not have control over the production decisions of the tea outgrowers except 
for the few state-owned plantations that it operates itself However, OCIR-THE can still control 
the marketing (and deduct the loan obligations) of private growers since it is the only processor-
buyer of tea in the country thereby ensuring its monopsonistic control over marketing. 
Furthermore, relatively stable and high tea prices generate sector-wide profitability. OCIR-
CAFE, which unsuccessfully attempted to adopt this same input distribution system, provides 
a counter example of failure. APNI, the third parastatal involved in fertilizer imports, engages 
in the sale of fertilizer based on subsidized prices. The sustainability of both OCIR-CAFE and 
APNI as independent economic agents involved in fertilizer distribution would be doubtful 
without access to the EEC subsidy for inputs. 
At the wholesale and retail levels of the fertilizer subsector in Rwanda, a few private 
entrepreneurs have began to emerge in the past two years. These entrepreneurs were already 
operating in the private sector, largely involved in trading consumer commodities. The 
distribution of fertilizer by these entrepreneurs follows the spot market mechanism, 21 where 
none of the traders engage in any other stage of commodity production or distribution. 
However, given the large subsidized intervention at the wholesale and retail levels by NGOs, 
it is not surprising that there is little private sector involvement in the marketing of fertilizer. 
Pesticides, in contrast to fertilizer, are imported into Rwanda by a few private entrepre-
neurs. At the same time, the parastatal institutions, APNI and OCIR-CAFE, import pesticides 
at close to world market prices. Therefore, the marketing of pesticides is more demand driven 
than is fertilizer, where demand is market driven only in the potato and tea subsectors. 
Pesticides are marketed by private entrepreneurs in wholesale and retail markets largely through 
spot market transactions. 
The supply leading public sector approach to the distribution of fertilizer at the import, 
wholesale and retail levels in Rwanda has constrained the emergence of an efficient private 
marketing system. The question that follows is: if parastatal institutions did "not receive subsidies 
and did not intervene in this subsector, would private sector agents spontaneously emerge in the 
fertilizer market in Rwanda? The answer is not completely clear; however, we are able to 
provide some insights on this issue. 
20 A resource providing contract involves a marketing firm which provides inputs for 
production and marketing outlets for its producers (Nagarajan and Meyer). 
21 Spot markets involve several firms that specialize in one or more stages of commodity 
marketing (Nagarajan and Meyer). 
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A. Profitability 
The tea subsector, regardless of its limited scale, enjoys high returns in Rwanda. The 
coffee subsector, however, has experienced a sharp decline in returns with the drop in interna-
tional coffee prices. Thus, although OCIR-THE and OCIR-CAFE are state-owned enterprises 
and have monopsonies on the purchase of tea and coffee, respectively, the former has succeeded 
in simulating a resource providing contractual arrangement with its producers while the latter 
has not. Both parastatals have high asset specificity, face a certain degree of production and 
market uncertainty, have good access to financial markets, and face little information 
asymmetry. The difference between the two parastatals seems to be the profitability of the 
subsectors in which they are specialized. 
The limited private sector involvement in the wholesale and retail distribution of fertilizer 
is not surprising given the level of intervention in the subsector in Rwanda. Private 
entrepreneurs have emerged over the past few years to sell mainly to potato growers. The 
demand for fertilizer in the northern part of Rwanda, where potatoes are grown, increased as 
this production realized improved yields and enjoyed higher returns as a result of using modem 
inputs. With low asset specificity requirements and access to financial markets, private traders 
engaged in fertilizer sales to potato growers largely through spot markets at competitive prices. 
These contracts, however, did not emerge in other subsectors such as traditional domestic crops 
or fresh fruits and vegetables because of the smaller scale of these operations and the lower 
returns generated. The demand for pesticides and fertilizer by fanners is largely a function of 
the profitability of the crop. It is very difficult to convince a poor agricultural producer to invest 
in modem inputs when the returns on production are low. 
B. Scale and Scope Economies 
The emergence of private economic agents in the fertilizer and pesticide subsectors 
continues to be a challenge in Rwanda, as in many African countries. Although entrepreneurs 
might enjoy some scope economies22 , scale economies23 are limited in the agricultural input 
subsectors, especially in small markets. Farmers are poorly informed about improved yields 
based on fertilizer and pesticide use and are uncertain how to use modern agricultural inputs in 
many cases. Nonetheless, in subsectors, such as tea, where there is a significant yield increase 
with the use of modern inputs even medium size plantations find it profitable to import fertilizer 
at world market prices for their own use. 24 
22 Economies of scope arise if two or more products can be jointly produced at a lower cost 
than is incurred in their independent production. In this case, there exists some input(s) which 
is (are) shared by two or more products without complete exhaustion of the resource(s). 
23 Economies of scale exist if per unit or average production costs decline as output rises. 
24 Information is based on an interview with the manager of a private tea plantation in 
Rwanda. 
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C. Small Land Holdings 
The poverty and small land holdings in Rwanda restnct large scale production processes 
which employ yield enhancing inputs and technologies. Small land holdings also imply that 
farmers will purchase fertilizer and pesticides in only very small quantities. Traders have to 
undertake the cost of breaking down and repackaging the 50 kilogram fertilizer bags purchased 
from wholesalers to resell in smaller quantities to individual farmers. 
D. Finance 
Access to financial markets does not appear to be a problem for the few entrepreneurs 
currently involved in the wholesale trade of fertilizer and pesticides. These established entrepre-
neurs have been able to draw largely on their retained earnings from other business activities to 
engage in a limited scale of fertilizer sales mainly sold for cash. Pesticides are imported by 
private entrepreneurs using letters of credit from the domestic commercial banks. With 
increased competition, however, trade credit might become an important marketing tool, as in 
the case of other subsectors. 25 The terms of trade credit for fertilizer and pesticides are 
dependent on the production cycle of the crop on which these inputs are used. Clearly, higher 
risk is associated with longer production periods (long season crops compared to short season 
ones) because of increased asymmetric information problems. 
2. Output Systems 
The production of horticultural crops in Rwanda is limited. This study examined three 
relatively important output subsectors: potatoes, the most commercialized crop in Rwanda; dry 
beans, although a basic staple, the country is least self-sufficient in the production of this crop; 
and fresh fruits and vegetables--tomatoes, french green beans and bananas--which are important 
because of their export potential. The factors influencing the observed market mechanisms with 
respect to each of these subsectors will be discussed next. 
The wholesale and retail trade in dry beans is characterized by spot market transactions. 
Wholesalers, although generally specialized in dry bean marketing, have a low investment in 
specific assets. There are relatively low production or market uncertainties in the dry bean 
subsector. Moreover, dry bean wholesalers utilize both formal and informal sources of finance. 
Interestingly, and common to spot market transactions, most sales are in cash. Little trade credit 
flows through the vertical marketing channel. Wholesale operators, in addition to using formal 
credit, obtain informal loans from their fellow wholesalers and participate in tontines at the retail 
level. This horizontal channel of finance at both levels of the marketing chain stands out in 
sharp contrast to the classic wholesale-retail flows of trade credit common in many developing 
and developed countries. This likely reflects the lack of well established and secure trading 
relationships between wholesalers and retailers in these markets in Rwanda which raises the risks 
25 See Baydas and Meyer. 
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of lending and borrowing. In contrast, the established relationships among those trading side 
by side in the market place creates sufficient confidence for reciprocal lending practices among 
these agents. 
The potato wholesale and retail trade is also characterized by spot market transactions. 
Many potato traders are new entrants in the market. The low level of asset specificity involved 
and the minimal sunk costs required to carry out trading facilitates entry into this market. Potato 
production faces few uncertainties with the use of modern inputs. More importantly, with 
unsophisticated local and regional demand for high quality products, and with high yields and 
returns, market uncertainties are very low and regional export opportunities are quite high. 
Potato wholesalers, similar to dry bean wholesalers, engage less in vertical trade finance relative 
to other types of informal finance, such as tontines and reciprocal credit among wholesaler 
networks. Formal finance was also reported to be quite accessible by these traders. 
The perishable fruits and vegetables of tomatoes, green beans and bananas were examined 
at the retail and wholesale/export levels. Tomatoes and green beans were typically sold at the 
retail level in spot market transactions. The production of these vegetables, although associated 
with relatively low asset specificity, involves relatively high production and market uncertainties. 
Production uncertainties grow out of the difficulties to control quality unless cultivation is closely 
monitored, while market uncertainty is strongly associated with the high degree of perishability 
of these crops. Access to finance in the case of retailers was limited to informal finance, largely 
tontines, and access to information was limited to the specific local retail markets in which they 
sell their produce. 
The wholesale trade in perishable fruits and vegetables, however, was characterized by 
two market mechanisms. In the case of french green beans, on the one hand, a resource 
providing and production management contract is administered by the French NGO (Loiret-
Butare). In order to ensure quality produce, this NGO provides modern inputs and seeds, 
technical assistance, agronomical supervision, packaging, and a marketing outlet for french beans 
outgrowers cultivating 30 hectares in the Loiret-Butare project. The 12roject has access to 
fmance and European market information, and has been exporting 150 tons annually for about 
3 years. Thus, a certain amount of asset specificity clearly exists. The project has demonstrated 
a capacity to deal with production and market uncertainty by closely monitoring production and 
by selling on consignment to a wholesaler in France. The project has also dealt with fmancial 
requirements by drawing on a subsidy from the Loiret department and with informational 
requirements by gaining access to information about the French market. These factors illustrate 
the range and magnitude of large sunk costs required to initiate an export operation in the area. 
In the case of the banana exporter, on the other hand, the contractual arrangement with 
banana outgrowers is a market specification contract. This contract involves only the marketing 
of the produce with production decisions left to outgrowers. The exporter has a low level of 
asset specificity and market uncertainties. However, this entrepreneur faces high production 
uncertainties from the small scale outgrowers typical of all farmers in the country. When 
initiating this activity, the entrepreneur had to incur some transaction costs to secure information 
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and relied mainly on retained earnings from other business activities to finance his export 
business. 
A. Small Land Holdings 
The most binding and difficult constraint for expanding the export potential of the country 
is the small land-holding pattern characteristic of most agricultural production. Large or medium 
sized commercial farms are not very common in Rwanda. This factor presents important 
production uncertainties for any marketing enterprise. It is particularly difficult to standardize 
production across a large number of outgrowers, especially when faced with high quality 
competition from Colombia and Kenya, the principal exporters of apple bananas and green beans 
to the European market. 
B. Access to Information and Finance 
A second constraint hindering the development of non-traditional agricultural exports is 
access to information and finance. These resources are costly for newly emerging private 
exporters to secure in Rwanda. However, bank financing is not the typical source of finance 
which economic agents use when engaging in new ventures. Evidence from the two case studies 
reported in this study indicate that retained earnings, savings and government funds have been 
used to initiate exports in Rwanda. This implies that private sector participation in non-
traditional exports would have to utilize either personal funds for the initial investment stage or 
seek external finance from venture capital firms which are better suited to finance risky newly 
emerging activities than are banks or commercial lenders. The constraint is that venture capital 
firms are not likely to fund small horticultural exporters because of their limited scale and scope, 
inherent risks of production, quality of products and demand in export markets. 
C. Transportation and Refrigeration Facilities 
Air transportation costs are expensive and the availability of air freight services is limited 
in Rwanda. This is not surprising considering that Rwanda is a land-locked country in central 
Africa. Moreover, the lack of refrigeration facilities at the Kigali airport makes the time 
between harvest and transportation of perishable fruits and vegetables very critical. Such facili-
ties would involve large investments and imply large costs for the enterprise. 
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The input and output distribution systems of the agricultural sector in Rwanda were 
examined in this study. The large intervention by the EEC and the government in the fertilizer 
distribution system, through a subsidized supply-leading approach, have generated a pre-market 
structure for this product market. It is only recently with new economic opportunities, realized 
through potato production and regional exports, that an effective demand for fertilizer has finally 
emerged. This has induced several private entrepreneurs to enter this sub sector. With access 
to finance and information, and a minimum investment or specialization, entrepreneurs are able 
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to engage in spot market activities to market fertilizer at the wholesale and retail levels. The 
import level, however, is still largely distorted by the price subsidy which precludes the 
emergence of any private sector initiative at this level of operation. 
Pesticides, in contrast to fertilizer, are imported into Rwanda by a few private entrepre-
neurs. At the same time, the parastatal institutions, APNI and OCIR-CAFE, import pesticides 
at close to world market prices. Therefore, the marketing of pesticides is more demand driven 
than is fertilizer, where fertilizer demand is market driven only in the potato and tea subsectors. 
Pesticides are marketed by private entrepreneurs at both the wholesale and retail levels largely 
through spot market transactions. 
A number of factors present constraints to private sector participation in the distribution 
of modem inputs. First, farmer demand for pesticides and fertilizer is largely a function of the 
profitability of the ·particular crop. Unless farmers are engaged in potato or tea production, they 
are neither willing nor able to purchase these inputs. Second, although entrepreneurs might 
enjoy some scope economies, scale economies are limited because of the small total demand. 
Third, the small land-holding structure in Rwanda restricts large scale production processes that 
employ yield enhancing inputs and technologies. Access to fmancial markets does not appear 
to be a problem for the few entrepreneurs currently involved in the wholesale trade of fertilizer 
and pesticides. With increased competition, however, trade credit might become an important 
marketing tool, as in the case of other subsectors. The terms of trade credit for fertilizer and 
pesticides are dependent on the production cycle of the crop on which these inputs are used. 
Clearly, higher risk is associated with longer production periods because of increased 
asymmetric information problems for any input dealer extending credit to farmers. 
To promote private sector initiative in the input marketing systems in Rwanda, certain 
conditions have to be ensured. In the case of pesticides, this implies reducing the quantities 
imported by parastatal institutions to allow private importers the opportunity to completely take 
over the import market. This in turn will further induce more private wholesale and retail 
marketing of pesticides to the extent there is an effective demand for the product. In the case 
of fertilizer, the primary condition to induce efficient private sector fertilizer marketing is to 
completely abolish import subsidies. This would imply that if economic opportunities exist--such 
as potato production which generates an effective demand for fertilizer--entrepreneurs would 
have an incentive to enter this subsector. 
It is important to continue research efforts to improve yields through the utilization of 
improved seed varieties, use of modem agricultural inputs and new technologies. This will help 
identify and expand the production frontier in Rwanda and other African countries, as they 
search for their comparative advantage in growing new crops with an export potential in both 
regional or international markets. Extension efforts should continue to educate farmers on the 
advantages of using improved seed varieties, and modem inputs and technologies provided they 
are clearly profitable. The effective demand for these inputs and technologies will grow 
naturally with the farmers' realization of improved yields and higher returns due to increased 
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use of these inputs. The challenging question, however, is how to convince or induce the 
government to abolish fertilizer subsidies? 
The production of horticultural crops in Rwanda is limited. This study examined three 
relatively important output subsectors. These are potatoes, dry beans and fresh fruits and 
vegetables, in particular tomatoes, french green beans and bananas. The wholesale and retail 
trade in dry beans and potatoes are largely characterized by spot market transactions. Wholesal-
ers, although generally specialized in dry bean marketing, have a low investment in specific 
assets. Many potato traders are new entrants in the market indicating the low level of asset 
specificity needed and minimal sunk costs to carry out trading which facilitate entry in this 
market. There are increasingly more dry bean wholesalers becoming involved in potato 
marketing. Potato production faces few uncertainties with the use of modern inputs. More 
importantly, with unsophisticated local and regional demand for high quality products, and with 
high yields and returns, market uncertainties are very low and regional export opportunities are 
quite good. 
Interestingly, and common to spot market transactions, most sales of potatoes and dry 
beans are made in cash. Little trade credit flows through the vertical marketing channel. 
Wholesale and retail operators, in addition to formal credit, draw upon informal loans from their 
fellow wholesalers and participate in tontines at the retail level. This horizontal channel of 
finance at both levels of the marketing chain stands out in sharp contrast to the classic wholesale-
retail flows of trade credit common to more developed countries. This likely reflects the lack 
of well established and secure trading relationships between wholesalers and retailers in these 
markets in Rwanda which raises the risks of lending and borrowing. In contrast, the established 
relationships among those trading side by side in the market place creates sufficient confidence 
for reciprocal lending practices among these agents. 
Perishable fruits and vegetables, tomatoes, green beans and bananas, were examined at 
the retail and wholesale/export levels. Tomatoes and green beans were typically sold at the 
retail level in spot market transactions. The production of these vegetables although associated 
with relatively low asset specificity, does involve relatively high production and market 
uncertainties. Production uncertainties grow out of the difficulties of quality control unless 
cultivation is closely monitored, while market uncertainty is strongly associated with the high 
degree of perishability of these crops. Access to finance in the case of retailers was limited to 
informal finance, largely tontines, and access to information was limited to the specific local 
retail markets in which they sell their produce. 
The export of non-traditional crops from Rwanda is limited; however, there have been 
successful attempts to draw up contractual arrangements with green beans and banana 
outgrowers. These arrangements include resource provisions, production management and 
marketing outlets. The current export activities, however, are confined to small scale initiatives. 
Policy efforts should focus on reducing some of the constraints to promote private sector 
participation. 
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The first and most difficult constraint to ease to promote horticultural non-traditional 
exports is the small land-holding structure in Rwanda possibly through more efficient cooperative 
farming systems or larger units of production. This constraint increases transaction costs and 
reduces scale economies of production. Moreover, this constraint hampers the production of 
consistent quality produce that has export potential. Technical assistance should attempt to train 
farmers to grow quality produce. A second constraint hindering the development of non-tradi-
tional agricultural exports is access to information and finance. These resources are costly for 
newly emerging private exporters to secure in Rwanda. Third, air transportation costs are 
expensive and the availability of regular and reliable air freight services is limited. Attracting 
airline companies to Rwanda would induce more competition in air cargo which would bring 
transportation costs more in line with market prices. Fourth, and last, the lack of refrigeration 
facilities at the airport in Kigali makes the time between harvest and transportation of perishable 
fruits and vegetables critical. Such facilities would involve large investments and imply a large 
asset specificity cost for any single enterprise. However, investment in refrigeration facilities 
would reduce the constraints on export initiatives. 
The prevailing conditions in Rwanda present binding constraints on the development of 
non-traditional agricultural exports. Public sector and donor intervention, however, could ease 
some those constraints. These efforts could largely focus on providing the appropriate 
information, infrastructure and technical support to encourage export activities. A potential role 
for the government, in addition to improving the quality of physical infrastructure in the country, 
could focus on stimulating domestic linkages with export markets. Facilitating information flows 
about foreign markets could be achieved by sending local representatives of traders associations 
abroad and providing information about domestic production to donors and foreign firms. 
Donors could play an important role in supporting local production of quality produce with 
export potential. One way to encourage the formation of export firms is to stimulate the creation 
of venture capital firms. Supporting supply-leading credit programs, however, should be 
avoided. Donors should carefully assess the role of support institutions, such as NGOs and 
cooperatives, that advice farmers on how to grow quality produce. The provision of technical 
assistance and the dissemination of new technologies to small producers in order to ensure the 
cultivation of high quality produce is the major challenge in the small land holding setting 
characteristic of Rwandan farmers. 
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ANNEX 
Persons and Institutions Visited in Rwanda. 
BICAHAGA, Chef du Service des Exportations, Banque Nationale du Rwanda. 
BW ANAKEYE, Bibiane - Fonde de Pouvoir Principal et Chef du Departement 
Commercial, Banque Commerciale du Rwanda, Kigali. 
Division des Statistiques Agricoles (D.S.A.) Ministry of Agriculture and Livestark, 
Daniel CLAY and David TARDIFF DOUG LIN (Researchers in Food Security Project -
MICHIGAN state University and Development Alternatives Inc, respectively) et. 
FULLER, Kurt- USAID RWANDA (ADO). 
• GASHUGI, Laurent - Chef de Division Alimentation et Intrants Agricoles (APNI) 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestark. 
KARAMBI, Edouard- Directeur Technique A.A.S.- Africa Agro Services (Private Input 
Dealer). 
• LOIRET-BUTARE Project, Interviews with Wholesalers and Technicians of Butare. 
• MAKUBA, Aaron- Directeur d' AGRIMAK (Commerce d'intrants agricoles), Kigali. 
MERLET, Jean Yves- Charge de Mission, Projet LOIRET-BUTARE, Kigali. 
• MPENGEKERE, A. - Chef de Section Marketing - OPROVIA. 
• MUNY AKAZI, Pierre Celestin - Directeur General des ASSURANCES INGOBOKA, 
Kigali. 
• MUNYANDAMUTSA, Telesphore- Responsable de l'Unite "APPUI-CONSEIL" au 
Centre IW ACU, Centre de Formation et de Recherches Cooperatives, Kigali. 
• MURAKAZANDEKWE, Benoit Eugene- DIRECTEUR, Direction Financiere- Union 
des Banques Populaires du Rwanda. 
• MURATHET, Pierre Yvan- Responsable du Volet P.A.F. au Projet Unite Operationn-
elle de Masaka (U.O.M.), Kigali. 
• NELSON, Gary - Directeur Mission USAID au Rwanda, Kigali. 
• NGIRA, Pierre- Chef du Service Produits Vivriers- OPROVIA. 
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• NIYIBIZI, Bonaventure- USAID- Kigali. 
• NIYOMUGABO, Fulgence - Gerant d' Agence bancatre, Banque Commerciale du 
Rwanda, Butare. 
• NSENGIMANA, Evase- Directeur de EMBALLAGE/RWANDA, Entreprise d'importa-
tion et Exportation. 
• NTUYEHE, Emmanuel- Chef de Section Documentation, Banque Nationale du Rwanda, 
Kigali. 
• NY ABYENDA, Dr Pierre - Durecteur Scientifique, Institut des Sciences Agronomiques 
du Rwanda (ISAR) in Butare. 
• PAGANIN, Paolo- Directeur d'AGROTECH KIGAU. 
• RIDPATH, Norman- Directeur Genaral de SORWATHE, Kigali. 
• RUKAKA, Assinapol - Chef du Service Technique - OCIR-THE. 
• SCHMELING, Wolfgang- Directeur Adjoint, Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda, 
Kigali. 
• SIBOMANA, Andre - Chef de Service Production- Office du Cafe - RWANDA (OCIR-
CAFE). 
• SOMA YIRE, Fran~ois - Expert National en Marketing International, C.C.I. - Centre du 
Commerce International CNUCED/GATT. 
• SYLVESTRE, Etienne - Directeur, Service du Credit, Banque de Kigali, Kigali. 
• TEGERA, Pierre- Directeur du P.N.A.P. Programme National de Ia Pomme de Terre, 
Ruhengeri. 
• V ANSCHEPDAEL, Ronny - Chef de Ia Division Credits, Banque Commerciale du 
Rwanda, Kigali. 
• Interviews with: wholesalers of fertilizer and pesticides; wholesalers and truckers of dry 
beans and potatoes, wholesalers of tomatoes, and retailers of fresh vegetables in Kigali, 
Gisenyi and Ruhengeri markets. 
